Domain Protection LLC v. Sea Wasp LLC

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

          AMOS L. MAZZANT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Pending before the Court are: (1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction by Individual Defendants Vernon Decossas and Gregory Faia (“Individual Defendants”) (Dkt. #173); (2) Sea Wasp, LLC's (“Sea Wasp”) Rule 17 Motion to Dismiss Regarding Real Party in Interest (Dkt. #180); (3) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing (Dkt. #228) (“Defendants” refers to Sea Wasp, Vernon Decossas, and Gregory Faia collectively); (4) Defendants' Motion to Extend Page Limit for Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing (Dkt. #247); and (5) Defendants' Motion to Schedule Hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing (Dkt. #253). Having considered the Motions and the relevant pleadings, the Court finds that each Motion is DENIED save Defendants' Motion to Extend Page Limit for Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing (Dkt. #247) which is GRANTED.

         BACKGROUND

         Domain Protection is the registered name holder for over 50, 000 domain names (the “Domain Names”). Sea Wasp is the registrar over those names. This suit concerns whether Sea Wasp is encroaching on Domain Protection's proprietary interest in the Domain Names by turning the executive lock on them, which prevents Domain Protection from selling the Domain Names or updating their registration information. Sea Wasp insists that Domain Protection lacks any proprietary interest in the Domain Names in light of a dispute over their ownership.

         A summary on how Domain Protection came into possession of the Domain Names may be helpful at this point. In 2014, three parties filed suit in the Northern District of Texas against Jeffrey Baron and one of his companies for misappropriating their domain names. The court found Baron to be a vexatious litigator and, on this basis, appointed a receiver (the “Receiver”) over his assets while the dispute was pending (Dkt. #54, Exhibit 15). The court also placed assets belonging to Novo Point, LLC (“Novo Point”) and Quantec, LLC (“Quantec”) (collectively, the “LLCs'”), two limited liability companies with ties to Baron (Dkt. #54, Exhibit 13), in the Receiver's custody. The LLCs' assets included the Domain Names.

         On appeal, Baron argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the receivership order, and the Fifth Circuit agreed. This prompted the district court to unwind the receivership (the “Unwind Order”) (Dkt. #54, Exhibit 17). Assets held in Baron's name would be returned to him. But it was not immediately apparent whom to return the LLCs' assets to in light of a dispute over who could properly act for them. Without resolving the dispute, the court directed the Receiver to return the Domain Names to Lisa Katz, the Local Operations Manager for the LLCs. Katz was entrusted to manage the LLCs' assets, including the Domain Names, until the dispute over control of the LLCs was resolved (Dkt. #54, Exhibit 14 at pp. 4-5 n.2; Dkt. #54, Exhibit 17).

         Baron-affiliates Mike Robertson and David McNair (the “Baron Affiliates”) tried to induce the registrar over the Domain Names, fabulous.com (“Fabulous”), into giving them control of the Domain Names anyway. But the Receiver intervened, instructing Fabulous to handover the Domain Names to Katz, pursuant to the Unwind Order (Dkt. #54, Exhibit 17). Katz then assumed control over the Domain Names. Katz explains that the LLCs had racked up substantial debt while they were under receivership, prompting “creditors [to] threaten[] to place the LLCs in bankruptcy for liquidation.” (Dkt. #54, Exhibit 31 at p. 2). To prevent this, Katz assigned the Domain Names to Domain Protection, a company where she is also manager. The plan was for Domain Protection to liquidate the Domain Names as needed to pay off the LLCs' debts (Dkt. #54, Exhibit 31 at p. 2). But Baron had contemporaneously filed suits in Texas and Australia challenging Katz's possession of the LLCs' assets. This prompted Fabulous to place an “executive lock” on the Domain Names while these actions were pending, which prevented Domain Protection from liquidating the Domain Names during the duration of the suits.

         Neither suit was successful (Dkt. #54, Exhibit 9; Dkt. #54, Exhibit 12). In August 2017, after the suits had been dismissed, Domain Protection asked Fabulous to restore its access to the Domain Names. Sea Wasp purchased Fabulous roughly at the same time. While the Parties dispute what immediately followed, they agree that, “[a]t least between January 28, 2018 to February 11, 2018, there was not an ‘Executive Lock' on the [D]omain [N]ames.” (Dkt. #42 at p. 1). Domain Protection began managing the affairs over the Domain Names shortly after. It started by replacing Bidtellect as the advertisement revenue manager (the “Advertising Manager”) for the Domain Names on receipt of a “concerning” letter from Bidtellect (Dkt. #54 at p. 10). Bidtellect was apparently exasperated with the series of disputes over the Domain Names and proposed certain non-negotiable terms to continue their contractual relationship. Domain Protection responded by terminating its contract with Bidtellect, contracting with a new Advertising Manager, and updating the registration information for the Domain Names accordingly. This involved updating the Domain Names' “nameserver records, ” which ensured that, when a user typed a Domain Protection domain name in a web browser, the user would be directed to a placeholder website hosted by the new Advertising Manager.

         By late February 2018, two or three weeks after the lock was removed, Baron filed another suit (the “Underlying Dispute”) challenging Katz's authority to transfer the Domain Names. See In re Payne, No. 16-04110 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2018). Domain Protection believes that Baron filed this suit simply to lock the Domain Names indefinitely, citing correspondence to that effect from Baron's attorneys (see Dkt. #54, Exhibit 28). Sure enough, Sea Wasp responded by reverting the changes Domain Protection had made to the Domain Names' nameserver records and turning the executive lock back on. Domain Protection notes that Robertson, one of the Baron Affiliates who tried to take control of the Domain Names in violation of the Unwind Order, is now a principal or “key person” at Sea Wasp (Dkt. #54, Exhibit 31 at pp. 3-4).

         On June 18, 2018, Domain Protection brought this present action against Sea Wasp for interference with contract, civil conspiracy, conversion, and respective violations of the Texas Theft Liability Act and the Stored Communications Act. Domain Protection alleges that, by turning the executive lock back on, Sea Wasp is encroaching on its proprietary interests in the Domain Names since it cannot transfer them or update their nameserver records. Sea Wasp, however, insists that it can and must place a lock on the Domain Names while a dispute is pending, citing its obligations as a registrar accredited with the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”). On July 17, 2019, the Court entered a Preliminary Injunction which enjoined Sea Wasp from “interfering with Domain Protection's control over the Domain Names, including its ability to update the nameserver records associated with the Domain Names” (Dkt. #192). Despite the Court's Order, matters have only further deteriorated between the parties.

         Since the filing of this action-only a little over one year ago-over 250 docket entries have occurred. One of those docket entries was Domain Protection's Amended Complaint (Dkt. #93). In its Amended Complaint, Domain Protection added Gregory Faia (“Faia”) and Vernon Decossas (“Decossas”) as Individual Defendants. It does well to provide a brief discussion of who the Individual Defendants are at this point. Faia and Decossas “are the owners and officers and directors of Sea Wasp” (Dkt. #173). Faia is domiciled in Lousiana (Dkt. #93; Dkt. #173) and Decossas is domiciled in Florida (Dkt. #93; Dkt. #173). Sea Wasp, on the other hand, was “created in 2017 as a Nevada limited liability company, [and] is a citizen of Louisiana whose members reside in Louisiana” (Dkt. #93). According to Domain Protection, “Faia and Decossas directly own, control and use Sea Wasp to accomplish the actions complained of in this Complaint (Dkt. #181) (citing Dkt. #93). Thus, Domain Protection claims that Sea Wasp is nothing more than a shell entity which the Individual Defendants use to evade existing legal obligations, rely upon as protection of a crime, and rely upon to justify any wrongs or torts (Dkt. #93). For these reasons, Domain Protection amended its complaint to add the Individual Defendants to the present action.

         The vast amount of docket activity previously referenced has not occurred without discord. The parties have vehemently disputed each claim, motion, and order and have continually engaged in ad hominem attacks unbecoming of officers of the Court.^[1] Among these contentious disputes, the parties have now turned to debating the capacity of this suit to be brought in the Court. On June 25, 2019, Vernon Decossas and Gregory Faia filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction by Individual Defendants Vernon Decossas and Gregory Faia (Dkt. #173).^[2] On July 5, 2019, Sea Wasp followed this Motion up with Sea Wasp, LLC's Rule 17 Motion to Dismiss Regarding Real Party in Interest (Dkt. #180).^[3] On August 19, 2019, Vernon Decossas, Gregory Faia, and Sea Wasp filed Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing (Dkt. #228). This Motion includes a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(h)(3) and Rule 12(b)(6) (Dkt. #228). Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing was followed by Defendants' Motion to Extend Page Limit for Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing (Dkt. #247) and Defendants' Motion to Schedule Hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing (Dkt. #253). Domain Protection opposes each Motion and claims that: (1) “Defendants Faia and Decossas were amenable to service of process and are subject to the personal jurisdiction of this Honorable Court through both the federal and state law claims in this case” (Dkt. #181); (2) Domain Protection is the holder of the substantive rights at issue in this action (Dkt. #195); (3) Domain Protection has a legally protected interest in the Domain Names and thus has established Article III standing (Dkt. #244); and (4) a hearing on the issue of standing is unnecessary (Dkt. #255). The Court addresses Sea Wasp's, Defendants, and the Individual Defendants' Motions below.

         LEGAL STANDARD

         a. Standing

         i. Rule 12(b)(1)

         “Different standards apply when a litigant challenges standing on a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) motion than on a motion for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.” Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1024 (5th Cir. 1991). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes dismissal of a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the district court lacks the “statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998); accord Fed. R. Civ. Pro 12(b)(1). If a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the Court will consider the jurisdictional attack under Rule 12(b)(1) before addressing any attack on the legal merits. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001).

         In deciding the motion, the Court may consider “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by the undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the [C]ourt's resolution of disputed facts.” Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996)). The Court will accept as true all well-pleaded allegations set forth in the complaint and construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we ‘presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.'”) (citing Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)); Truman v. United States, 26 F.3d 592, 594 (5th Cir. 1994). Once a defendant files a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and challenges jurisdiction, the party invoking jurisdiction has the burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction. See Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980). The Court will grant a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction only if it appears certain that the claimant cannot prove a plausible set of facts to support a claim that would entitle it to relief. Lane, 529 F.3d at 557.

         When the defendant moves for summary judgment because of a lack of standing, however, the plaintiff must submit affidavits and comparable evidence that indicate that a genuine issue of fact exists on the standing issue. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (“In response to a summary judgment motion, however, the plaintiff can no longer rest on such “mere allegations, ” but must “set forth” by affidavit or other evidence “specific facts, ” Fed. R Civ. Pro. 56(e), which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true. And at the final stage, those facts (if controverted) must be “supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial.” (citing Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 114-15 (1979)).

         ii. Rule 12(b)(6)

         The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that each claim in a complaint include a “short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Each claim must include enough factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

         A Rule 12(b)(6) motion allows a party to move for dismissal of an action when the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in plaintiff's complaint and view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bowlby v. City of Aberdeen, 681 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2012). The Court may consider “the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). The Court must then determine whether the complaint states a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. ‘“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the [C]ourt to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the [C]ourt to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).

         In Iqbal, the Supreme Court established a two-step approach for assessing the sufficiency of a complaint in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. First, the Court should identify and disregard conclusory allegations, for they are “not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664. Second, the Court “consider[s] the factual allegations in [the complaint] to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id. “This standard ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary claims or elements.'” Morgan v. Hubert, 335 Fed.Appx. 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). This evaluation will “be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing [C]ourt to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

         Thus, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”' Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

         b. Rule 17(a) - Real Party in Interest

         Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) provides that “all actions be prosecuted in the name of the ‘real party in interest.' The real party in interest is the person holding the substantive right sought to be enforced, and not necessarily the person who will ultimately benefit from the recovery.” U.S. ex rel. Spicer v. Westbrook, 751 D.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Wieburg v. GTE Sw. Inc., 272 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 2014); Farrell Constr. Co. v. Jefferson Parish, 896 F.2d 136, 140 (5th Cir. 1990)). To determine who the real party in interest is under Rule 17(a), a court must determine whether the party is granted the right to sue under the applicable substantive law. See Lubbock Feed Lots, Inc. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 630 F.2d 250, 256 (5th Cir. 1980).

         Rule 17(a) limits a Court's discretion to “dismiss an action for failure to prosecute in the name of the real party in interest until, after an objection, a reasonable time has been allowed for the real party in interest to ratify, join, or be substituted into the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(a)(3); see also BCC Merchant Solutions, Inc. v. Jet Pay, LLC, 129 F.Supp.3d. 440, 459 (N.D. Tex. 2015). Any defense claiming that a party is not the real party in interest “is waived when it is not timely asserted.” Rogers v. Samedan Oil Corp., 308 F.3d 477, 483 (2002) (citing Gogolin & Stelter v. Karn's Auto Imports, Inc., 886 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1989). “The objection must be raised when joinder is practical and convenient. The earlier the defense is raised, the more likely that the high cost of trial preparation for both parties can be avoided if a real party in interest question is determined adversely to a plaintiff.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “There is no magic formula for determining practicality and convenience.” In re Signal Intern., LLC, 579 F.2d 478, 488 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing 6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1554 (2d ed. 1990) (noting that Rule 17 does not “indicate when the challenge should be made” and documenting that an objection should be made with “reasonable promptness”)). Indeed, “[t]he decision turns on the facts of each case and is within the discretion of the district court.” Id.; see also Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1554 (“[T]he courts should be given the flexibility to treat the waiver question as one addressed to their discretion so that the issue can be determined in terms of what seems appropriate in a particular case.”). The Fifth Circuit has instructed that there are multiple factors a court should consider when determining whether a Rule 17(a) defense has been waived. Id. Those factors include:

[W]hen the defendant knew or should have known about the facts giving rise to the plaintiff's disputed status as a real party in interest; whether the objection was raised in time to allow the plaintiff a meaningful opportunity to prove its status; whether it was raised in time to allow the real party in interest a reasonable opportunity to join the action if the objection proved successful; and other case-specific considerations of judicial efficiency or fairness to the parties.

Id.

         c. Rule 12(b)(2) - Personal Jurisdiction

         Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) requires a court to dismiss a claim if the court does not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). After a non-resident defendant files a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, it is the plaintiff's burden to establish that in personam jurisdiction exists. Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing WNS, Inc. v. Farrow, 884 F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir. 1989)).

         To satisfy that burden, the party seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction must “present sufficient facts as to make out only a prima facie case supporting jurisdiction, ” if a court rules on a motion without an evidentiary hearing. Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 215 (5th Cir. 2000). When considering the motion to dismiss, “[a]llegations in [a] plaintiff's complaint are taken as true except to the extent that they are contradicted by defendant's affidavits.” Int'l Truck & Engine Corp. v. Quintana, 259 F.Supp.2d 553, 557 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (citing Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 282-83 n.13 (5th Cir. 1982)); accord Black v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 564 F.2d 681, 683 n.3 (5th Cir. 1977). Further, “[a]ny genuine, material conflicts between the facts established by the parties' affidavits and other evidence are resolved in favor of plaintiff for the purposes of determining whether a prima facie case exists.” Id. (citing Jones v. Petty-Ray Geophysical Geosource, Inc., 954 F.2d 161, 1067 (5th Cir. 1992)). However, if a court holds an evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff “must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the admissible evidence.” In re Chinese Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Lit., 742 F.3d 576, 585 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Walk Haydel & Assocs., Inc. v. Coastal Power Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 235, 241-42 (5th Cir. 2008)).

         A court conducts a two-step inquiry when a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction. Ham v. La Cinega Music Co., 4 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir. 1993). First, absent a controlling federal statute regarding service of process, the court must determine whether the forum state's long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. And second, the court establishes whether the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with due process under the United States Constitution.

         The Texas long-arm statute confers jurisdiction to the limits of due process under the Constitution. Command-Aire Corp. v. Ont. Mech. Sales and Serv. Inc., 963 F.2d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1992). Therefore, the sole inquiry that remains is whether personal jurisdiction offends or comports with federal constitutional guarantees. Bullion, 895 F.2d at 216. The Due Process Clause permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant when the defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum state “such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Minimum contacts with a forum state can be satisfied by contacts that give rise to either general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction. Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1994).

         General jurisdiction exists only when the defendant's contacts with the forum state are so “‘continuous and systematic' as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)); see Cent. Freight Lines v. APA Transp. Corp., 322 F.3d 376, 381 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colum., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984)). Substantial, continuous and systematic contact with a forum is a difficult standard to meet and requires extensive contacts between a defendant and the forum. Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int'l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 2008). “General jurisdiction can be assessed by evaluating contacts of the defendant with the forum over a reasonable number of years, up to the date the suit was filed.” Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 717 (5th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). However, “vague and overgeneralized assertions that give no indication as to the extent, duration, or frequency of contacts are insufficient to support general jurisdiction.” Johnston, 523 F.3d at 609 (citing Gardemal v. Westin Hotel Co., 186 F.3d 588, 596 (5th Cir. 1999)).

         Specific jurisdiction is proper when the plaintiff alleges a cause of action that grows out of or relates to a contact between the defendant and the forum state. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8. For the court to exercise specific jurisdiction, the court must determine “(1) whether the defendant has . . . purposely directed its activities toward the forum state or purposely availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities there; (2) whether the plaintiff's cause of action arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related contacts; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is fair and reasonable.” Nuovo Pignone, SpA v. STORMAN ASIA M/V, 310 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)).

         Defendants who “‘reach out beyond one state' and create continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of another state are subject to regulation and sanctions in the other state for consequences of their actions.” Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475 (citing Travelers Health Assoc. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950)). Establishing a defendant's minimum contacts with the forum state requires contacts that are more than “random, fortuitous, or attenuated, or of the unilateral activity of another party or third person.” Id.

         “If the plaintiff successfully satisfies the first two prongs, the burden shifts to the defendant to defeat jurisdiction by showing that its exercise would be unfair or unreasonable.” Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 271 (5th Cir. 2006). In this inquiry, the Court examines five factors: (1) the burden on the nonresident defendant; (2) the forum state's interests; (3) the plaintiff's interest in securing relief; (4) the interest of the interstate judicial system in the efficient administration of justice; and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental social policies. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477. “It is rare to say the assertion of jurisdiction is unfair after minimum contacts have been shown.” McFadin v. Gerber, 587 F.3d 753, 760 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Wien Air Alaska, Inc. v. Brandt, 195 F.3d 208, 215 (5th Cir. 1999)).

         ANALYSIS

         I. Motion to Dismiss under 12(b)(6)

         Defendants filed a Motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The Court, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts, Bowlby, 681 F.3d at 219, finds that Domain Protection has stated a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. ...