United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
L. MAZZANT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
before the Court are: (1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction by Individual Defendants Vernon
Decossas and Gregory Faia (“Individual
Defendants”) (Dkt. #173); (2) Sea Wasp, LLC's
(“Sea Wasp”) Rule 17 Motion to Dismiss Regarding
Real Party in Interest (Dkt. #180); (3) Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing (Dkt. #228)
(“Defendants” refers to Sea Wasp, Vernon
Decossas, and Gregory Faia collectively); (4) Defendants'
Motion to Extend Page Limit for Reply in Support of Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Standing (Dkt. #247); and (5)
Defendants' Motion to Schedule Hearing on Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing (Dkt. #253). Having
considered the Motions and the relevant pleadings, the Court
finds that each Motion is DENIED save
Defendants' Motion to Extend Page Limit for Reply in
Support of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing (Dkt. #247)
which is GRANTED.
Protection is the registered name holder for over 50, 000
domain names (the “Domain Names”). Sea Wasp is
the registrar over those names. This suit concerns whether
Sea Wasp is encroaching on Domain Protection's
proprietary interest in the Domain Names by turning the
executive lock on them, which prevents Domain Protection from
selling the Domain Names or updating their registration
information. Sea Wasp insists that Domain Protection lacks
any proprietary interest in the Domain Names in light of a
dispute over their ownership.
summary on how Domain Protection came into possession of the
Domain Names may be helpful at this point. In 2014, three
parties filed suit in the Northern District of Texas against
Jeffrey Baron and one of his companies for misappropriating
their domain names. The court found Baron to be a vexatious
litigator and, on this basis, appointed a receiver (the
“Receiver”) over his assets while the dispute was
pending (Dkt. #54, Exhibit 15). The court also placed assets
belonging to Novo Point, LLC (“Novo Point”) and
Quantec, LLC (“Quantec”) (collectively, the
“LLCs'”), two limited liability companies
with ties to Baron (Dkt. #54, Exhibit 13), in the
Receiver's custody. The LLCs' assets included the
appeal, Baron argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to
enter the receivership order, and the Fifth Circuit agreed.
This prompted the district court to unwind the receivership
(the “Unwind Order”) (Dkt. #54, Exhibit 17).
Assets held in Baron's name would be returned to him. But
it was not immediately apparent whom to return the LLCs'
assets to in light of a dispute over who could properly act
for them. Without resolving the dispute, the court directed
the Receiver to return the Domain Names to Lisa Katz, the
Local Operations Manager for the LLCs. Katz was entrusted to
manage the LLCs' assets, including the Domain Names,
until the dispute over control of the LLCs was resolved (Dkt.
#54, Exhibit 14 at pp. 4-5 n.2; Dkt. #54, Exhibit 17).
Mike Robertson and David McNair (the “Baron
Affiliates”) tried to induce the registrar over the
Domain Names, fabulous.com (“Fabulous”), into
giving them control of the Domain Names anyway. But the
Receiver intervened, instructing Fabulous to handover the
Domain Names to Katz, pursuant to the Unwind Order (Dkt. #54,
Exhibit 17). Katz then assumed control over the Domain Names.
Katz explains that the LLCs had racked up substantial debt
while they were under receivership, prompting
“creditors [to] threaten to place the LLCs in
bankruptcy for liquidation.” (Dkt. #54, Exhibit 31 at
p. 2). To prevent this, Katz assigned the Domain Names to
Domain Protection, a company where she is also manager. The
plan was for Domain Protection to liquidate the Domain Names
as needed to pay off the LLCs' debts (Dkt. #54, Exhibit
31 at p. 2). But Baron had contemporaneously filed suits in
Texas and Australia challenging Katz's possession of the
LLCs' assets. This prompted Fabulous to place an
“executive lock” on the Domain Names while these
actions were pending, which prevented Domain Protection from
liquidating the Domain Names during the duration of the
suit was successful (Dkt. #54, Exhibit 9; Dkt. #54, Exhibit
12). In August 2017, after the suits had been dismissed,
Domain Protection asked Fabulous to restore its access to the
Domain Names. Sea Wasp purchased Fabulous roughly at the same
time. While the Parties dispute what immediately followed,
they agree that, “[a]t least between January 28, 2018
to February 11, 2018, there was not an ‘Executive
Lock' on the [D]omain [N]ames.” (Dkt. #42 at p. 1).
Domain Protection began managing the affairs over the Domain
Names shortly after. It started by replacing Bidtellect as
the advertisement revenue manager (the “Advertising
Manager”) for the Domain Names on receipt of a
“concerning” letter from Bidtellect (Dkt. #54 at
p. 10). Bidtellect was apparently exasperated with the series
of disputes over the Domain Names and proposed certain
non-negotiable terms to continue their contractual
relationship. Domain Protection responded by terminating its
contract with Bidtellect, contracting with a new Advertising
Manager, and updating the registration information for the
Domain Names accordingly. This involved updating the Domain
Names' “nameserver records, ” which ensured
that, when a user typed a Domain Protection domain name in a
web browser, the user would be directed to a placeholder
website hosted by the new Advertising Manager.
February 2018, two or three weeks after the lock was removed,
Baron filed another suit (the “Underlying
Dispute”) challenging Katz's authority to transfer
the Domain Names. See In re Payne, No. 16-04110
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2018). Domain Protection believes that
Baron filed this suit simply to lock the Domain Names
indefinitely, citing correspondence to that effect from
Baron's attorneys (see Dkt. #54, Exhibit 28).
Sure enough, Sea Wasp responded by reverting the changes
Domain Protection had made to the Domain Names'
nameserver records and turning the executive lock back on.
Domain Protection notes that Robertson, one of the Baron
Affiliates who tried to take control of the Domain Names in
violation of the Unwind Order, is now a principal or
“key person” at Sea Wasp (Dkt. #54, Exhibit 31 at
18, 2018, Domain Protection brought this present action
against Sea Wasp for interference with contract, civil
conspiracy, conversion, and respective violations of the
Texas Theft Liability Act and the Stored Communications Act.
Domain Protection alleges that, by turning the executive lock
back on, Sea Wasp is encroaching on its proprietary interests
in the Domain Names since it cannot transfer them or update
their nameserver records. Sea Wasp, however, insists that it
can and must place a lock on the Domain Names while a dispute
is pending, citing its obligations as a registrar accredited
with the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(“ICANN”). On July 17, 2019, the Court entered a
Preliminary Injunction which enjoined Sea Wasp from
“interfering with Domain Protection's control over
the Domain Names, including its ability to update the
nameserver records associated with the Domain Names”
(Dkt. #192). Despite the Court's Order, matters have only
further deteriorated between the parties.
the filing of this action-only a little over one year
ago-over 250 docket entries have occurred. One of those
docket entries was Domain Protection's Amended Complaint
(Dkt. #93). In its Amended Complaint, Domain Protection added
Gregory Faia (“Faia”) and Vernon Decossas
(“Decossas”) as Individual Defendants. It does
well to provide a brief discussion of who the Individual
Defendants are at this point. Faia and Decossas “are
the owners and officers and directors of Sea Wasp”
(Dkt. #173). Faia is domiciled in Lousiana (Dkt. #93; Dkt.
#173) and Decossas is domiciled in Florida (Dkt. #93; Dkt.
#173). Sea Wasp, on the other hand, was “created in
2017 as a Nevada limited liability company, [and] is a
citizen of Louisiana whose members reside in Louisiana”
(Dkt. #93). According to Domain Protection, “Faia and
Decossas directly own, control and use Sea Wasp to accomplish
the actions complained of in this Complaint (Dkt. #181)
(citing Dkt. #93). Thus, Domain Protection claims that Sea
Wasp is nothing more than a shell entity which the Individual
Defendants use to evade existing legal obligations, rely upon
as protection of a crime, and rely upon to justify any wrongs
or torts (Dkt. #93). For these reasons, Domain Protection
amended its complaint to add the Individual Defendants to the
vast amount of docket activity previously referenced has not
occurred without discord. The parties have vehemently
disputed each claim, motion, and order and have continually
engaged in ad hominem attacks unbecoming of officers of the
Court. Among these contentious disputes, the
parties have now turned to debating the capacity of this suit
to be brought in the Court. On June 25, 2019, Vernon Decossas
and Gregory Faia filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction by Individual Defendants Vernon
Decossas and Gregory Faia (Dkt. #173). On July 5, 2019,
Sea Wasp followed this Motion up with Sea Wasp, LLC's
Rule 17 Motion to Dismiss Regarding Real Party in Interest
(Dkt. #180). On August 19, 2019, Vernon Decossas,
Gregory Faia, and Sea Wasp filed Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Standing (Dkt. #228). This Motion
includes a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(h)(3) and Rule
12(b)(6) (Dkt. #228). Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Standing was followed by Defendants' Motion to
Extend Page Limit for Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Standing (Dkt. #247) and Defendants' Motion
to Schedule Hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Standing (Dkt. #253). Domain Protection opposes each
Motion and claims that: (1) “Defendants Faia and
Decossas were amenable to service of process and are subject
to the personal jurisdiction of this Honorable Court through
both the federal and state law claims in this case”
(Dkt. #181); (2) Domain Protection is the holder of the
substantive rights at issue in this action (Dkt. #195); (3)
Domain Protection has a legally protected interest in the
Domain Names and thus has established Article III standing
(Dkt. #244); and (4) a hearing on the issue of standing is
unnecessary (Dkt. #255). The Court addresses Sea Wasp's,
Defendants, and the Individual Defendants' Motions below.
standards apply when a litigant challenges standing on a
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) motion than on a motion for summary
judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.” Cramer v.
Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1024 (5th Cir. 1991). Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes dismissal of a
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the
district court lacks the “statutory or constitutional
power to adjudicate the case.” Home Builders
Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d
1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998); accord Fed. R. Civ. Pro
12(b)(1). If a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction
with other Rule 12 motions, the Court will consider the
jurisdictional attack under Rule 12(b)(1) before addressing
any attack on the legal merits. Ramming v. United
States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001).
deciding the motion, the Court may consider “(1) the
complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by the
undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the
complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the
[C]ourt's resolution of disputed facts.” Lane
v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74
F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996)). The Court will accept as true
all well-pleaded allegations set forth in the complaint and
construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“At the pleading stage, general
factual allegations of injury resulting from the
defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to
dismiss we ‘presum[e] that general allegations embrace
those specific facts that are necessary to support the
claim.'”) (citing Lujan v. National Wildlife
Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)); Truman v.
United States, 26 F.3d 592, 594 (5th Cir. 1994). Once a
defendant files a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and
challenges jurisdiction, the party invoking jurisdiction has
the burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction. See
Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511
(5th Cir. 1980). The Court will grant a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction only if it appears
certain that the claimant cannot prove a plausible set of
facts to support a claim that would entitle it to relief.
Lane, 529 F.3d at 557.
the defendant moves for summary judgment because of a lack of
standing, however, the plaintiff must submit affidavits and
comparable evidence that indicate that a genuine issue of
fact exists on the standing issue. See Lujan, 504
U.S. at 561 (“In response to a summary judgment motion,
however, the plaintiff can no longer rest on such “mere
allegations, ” but must “set forth” by
affidavit or other evidence “specific facts, ”
Fed. R Civ. Pro. 56(e), which for purposes of the summary
judgment motion will be taken to be true. And at the final
stage, those facts (if controverted) must be “supported
adequately by the evidence adduced at trial.” (citing
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S.
91, 114-15 (1979)).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that each claim in a
complaint include a “short and plain statement . . .
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Each claim must include enough factual
allegations “to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
12(b)(6) motion allows a party to move for dismissal of an
action when the complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When
considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
Court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in
plaintiff's complaint and view those facts in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Bowlby v. City of
Aberdeen, 681 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2012). The Court
may consider “the complaint, any documents attached to
the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to
dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the
complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v.
Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010).
The Court must then determine whether the complaint states a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face.
‘“A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the [C]ourt to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.'” Gonzalez v.
Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
“But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
[C]ourt to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not
‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to
relief.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting
Iqbal, the Supreme Court established a two-step
approach for assessing the sufficiency of a complaint in the
context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. First, the Court should
identify and disregard conclusory allegations, for they are
“not entitled to the assumption of truth.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664. Second, the Court
“consider[s] the factual allegations in [the complaint]
to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to
relief.” Id. “This standard
‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the
necessary claims or elements.'” Morgan v.
Hubert, 335 Fed.Appx. 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted). This evaluation will “be a context-specific
task that requires the reviewing [C]ourt to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679.
“[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.”' Id. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Rule 17(a) - Real Party in Interest
Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) provides that “all
actions be prosecuted in the name of the ‘real party in
interest.' The real party in interest is the person
holding the substantive right sought to be enforced, and not
necessarily the person who will ultimately benefit from the
recovery.” U.S. ex rel. Spicer v. Westbrook,
751 D.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Wieburg v. GTE
Sw. Inc., 272 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 2014); Farrell
Constr. Co. v. Jefferson Parish, 896 F.2d 136, 140 (5th
Cir. 1990)). To determine who the real party in interest is
under Rule 17(a), a court must determine whether the party is
granted the right to sue under the applicable substantive
law. See Lubbock Feed Lots, Inc. v. Iowa Beef Processors,
Inc., 630 F.2d 250, 256 (5th Cir. 1980).
17(a) limits a Court's discretion to “dismiss an
action for failure to prosecute in the name of the real party
in interest until, after an objection, a reasonable time has
been allowed for the real party in interest to ratify, join,
or be substituted into the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
17(a)(3); see also BCC Merchant Solutions, Inc. v. Jet
Pay, LLC, 129 F.Supp.3d. 440, 459 (N.D. Tex. 2015). Any
defense claiming that a party is not the real party in
interest “is waived when it is not timely
asserted.” Rogers v. Samedan Oil Corp., 308
F.3d 477, 483 (2002) (citing Gogolin & Stelter v.
Karn's Auto Imports, Inc., 886 F.2d 100 (5th Cir.
1989). “The objection must be raised when joinder is
practical and convenient. The earlier the defense is raised,
the more likely that the high cost of trial preparation for
both parties can be avoided if a real party in interest
question is determined adversely to a plaintiff.”
Id. (internal citations omitted). “There is no
magic formula for determining practicality and
convenience.” In re Signal Intern., LLC, 579
F.2d 478, 488 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing 6A Charles Alan Wright,
Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1554 (2d ed. 1990) (noting that Rule 17 does
not “indicate when the challenge should be made”
and documenting that an objection should be made with
“reasonable promptness”)). Indeed, “[t]he
decision turns on the facts of each case and is within the
discretion of the district court.” Id.; see
also Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1554 (“[T]he courts should be given the
flexibility to treat the waiver question as one addressed to
their discretion so that the issue can be determined in terms
of what seems appropriate in a particular case.”). The
Fifth Circuit has instructed that there are multiple factors
a court should consider when determining whether a Rule 17(a)
defense has been waived. Id. Those factors include:
[W]hen the defendant knew or should have known about the
facts giving rise to the plaintiff's disputed status as a
real party in interest; whether the objection was raised in
time to allow the plaintiff a meaningful opportunity to prove
its status; whether it was raised in time to allow the real
party in interest a reasonable opportunity to join the action
if the objection proved successful; and other case-specific
considerations of judicial efficiency or fairness to the
Rule 12(b)(2) - Personal Jurisdiction
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) requires a court to dismiss
a claim if the court does not have personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). After a non-resident
defendant files a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, it is the plaintiff's burden to establish
that in personam jurisdiction exists. Bullion v.
Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing
WNS, Inc. v. Farrow, 884 F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir.
satisfy that burden, the party seeking to invoke the
court's jurisdiction must “present sufficient facts
as to make out only a prima facie case supporting
jurisdiction, ” if a court rules on a motion without an
evidentiary hearing. Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco
AB, 205 F.3d 208, 215 (5th Cir. 2000). When considering
the motion to dismiss, “[a]llegations in [a]
plaintiff's complaint are taken as true except to the
extent that they are contradicted by defendant's
affidavits.” Int'l Truck & Engine Corp. v.
Quintana, 259 F.Supp.2d 553, 557 (N.D. Tex. 2003)
(citing Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 282-83 n.13
(5th Cir. 1982)); accord Black v. Acme Mkts., Inc.,
564 F.2d 681, 683 n.3 (5th Cir. 1977). Further, “[a]ny
genuine, material conflicts between the facts established by
the parties' affidavits and other evidence are resolved
in favor of plaintiff for the purposes of determining whether
a prima facie case exists.” Id.
(citing Jones v. Petty-Ray Geophysical Geosource,
Inc., 954 F.2d 161, 1067 (5th Cir. 1992)). However, if a
court holds an evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff “must
establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the admissible
evidence.” In re Chinese Manufactured Drywall
Prods. Liab. Lit., 742 F.3d 576, 585 (5th Cir. 2014)
(citing Walk Haydel & Assocs., Inc. v. Coastal Power
Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 235, 241-42 (5th Cir. 2008)).
conducts a two-step inquiry when a defendant challenges
personal jurisdiction. Ham v. La Cinega Music Co., 4
F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir. 1993). First, absent a controlling
federal statute regarding service of process, the court must
determine whether the forum state's long-arm statute
confers personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
Id. And second, the court establishes whether the
exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with due process under
the United States Constitution.
Texas long-arm statute confers jurisdiction to the limits of
due process under the Constitution. Command-Aire Corp. v.
Ont. Mech. Sales and Serv. Inc., 963 F.2d 90, 93 (5th
Cir. 1992). Therefore, the sole inquiry that remains is
whether personal jurisdiction offends or comports with
federal constitutional guarantees. Bullion, 895 F.2d
at 216. The Due Process Clause permits the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant when the
defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum
state “such that maintenance of the suit does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.” Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Minimum contacts with a forum state
can be satisfied by contacts that give rise to either general
jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction. Wilson v.
Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1994).
jurisdiction exists only when the defendant's contacts
with the forum state are so “‘continuous and
systematic' as to render them essentially at home in the
forum State.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.
117, 127 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011));
see Cent. Freight Lines v. APA Transp. Corp., 322
F.3d 376, 381 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colum., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408, 414 n.8 (1984)). Substantial, continuous and systematic
contact with a forum is a difficult standard to meet and
requires extensive contacts between a defendant and the
forum. Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int'l Corp.,
523 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 2008). “General
jurisdiction can be assessed by evaluating contacts of the
defendant with the forum over a reasonable number of years,
up to the date the suit was filed.” Access Telecom,
Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 717 (5th
Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). However, “vague and
overgeneralized assertions that give no indication as to the
extent, duration, or frequency of contacts are insufficient
to support general jurisdiction.” Johnston,
523 F.3d at 609 (citing Gardemal v. Westin Hotel
Co., 186 F.3d 588, 596 (5th Cir. 1999)).
jurisdiction is proper when the plaintiff alleges a cause of
action that grows out of or relates to a contact between the
defendant and the forum state. Helicopteros, 466
U.S. at 414 n.8. For the court to exercise specific
jurisdiction, the court must determine “(1) whether the
defendant has . . . purposely directed its activities toward
the forum state or purposely availed itself of the privileges
of conducting activities there; (2) whether the
plaintiff's cause of action arises out of or results from
the defendant's forum-related contacts; and (3) whether
the exercise of personal jurisdiction is fair and
reasonable.” Nuovo Pignone, SpA v. STORMAN ASIA
M/V, 310 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474
who “‘reach out beyond one state' and create
continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of
another state are subject to regulation and sanctions in the
other state for consequences of their actions.”
Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475 (citing
Travelers Health Assoc. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643,
647 (1950)). Establishing a defendant's minimum contacts
with the forum state requires contacts that are more than
“random, fortuitous, or attenuated, or of the
unilateral activity of another party or third person.”
the plaintiff successfully satisfies the first two prongs,
the burden shifts to the defendant to defeat jurisdiction by
showing that its exercise would be unfair or
unreasonable.” Seiferth v. Helicopteros
Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 271 (5th Cir.
2006). In this inquiry, the Court examines five factors: (1)
the burden on the nonresident defendant; (2) the forum
state's interests; (3) the plaintiff's interest in
securing relief; (4) the interest of the interstate judicial
system in the efficient administration of justice; and (5)
the shared interest of the several states in furthering
fundamental social policies. Burger King, 471 U.S.
at 477. “It is rare to say the assertion of
jurisdiction is unfair after minimum contacts have been
shown.” McFadin v. Gerber, 587 F.3d 753, 760
(5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Wien Air Alaska, Inc. v.
Brandt, 195 F.3d 208, 215 (5th Cir. 1999)).
Motion to Dismiss under 12(b)(6)
filed a Motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim. The Court, accepting as true all well-pleaded
facts, Bowlby, 681 F.3d at 219, finds that Domain
Protection has stated a claim for relief that is plausible on
its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. ...