On
Appeal from the 29th District Court Palo Pinto County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. C48299
Panel
consists of: Bailey, C.J., Stretcher, J., and Wright, S.C.J.
[1]
MEMORANDUM OPINION
JOHN
M. BAILEY CHIEF JUSTICE
Based
upon a petition filed by the mother of J.E.D., the trial
court terminated the parental rights of J.E.D.'s father
and granted the mother's request to change the
child's name. The father filed a pro se notice of appeal.
We affirm.
At the
outset, we note that Appellant failed to adhere to the
briefing standards required by the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1. Although
Appellant's brief does not meet all of the requirements
of Rule 38.1, we will construe the briefing rules liberally
and attempt to address the issues raised in Appellant's
brief. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.9. Based upon our
review of Appellant's brief and his supplemental filings,
we believe that Appellant has asserted the following issues:
(1) a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, (2) a
complaint that his rights were violated by the failure of the
trial court to appoint an attorney to represent Appellant,
(3) a complaint that the trial judge should not have presided
over this civil matter, and (4) a request for this case to
remain open for five years.
Termination
Findings and Standards
The
termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)
(West Supp. 2018). To terminate parental rights, it must be
shown by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has
committed one of the acts listed in Section
161.001(b)(1)(A)-(U) and that termination is in the best
interest of the child. Id.
In this
case, the trial court found that Appellant had committed
three of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)-those found
in subsections (E), (L), and (Q). Specifically, the trial
court found that Appellant had engaged in conduct or
knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in
conduct that endangered the child's physical or emotional
well-being, that Appellant had been convicted or placed on
community supervision for being criminally responsible for
the death or serious injury of a child, and that Appellant
had knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in
his conviction and confinement and inability to care for the
child for not less than two years from the date that the
petition was filed. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E),
(L), (Q). The trial court also found, pursuant to Section
161.001(b)(2), that termination of Appellant's parental
rights would be in the best interest of the child. See
id. § 161.001(b)(2).
To
determine if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental
termination case, we review all of the evidence in the light
most favorable to the finding and determine whether a
rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or
conviction that its finding was true. In re J.P.B.,
180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the evidence
is factually sufficient in a parental termination case, we
give due deference to the finding and determine whether, on
the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm
belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations
against the parent. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25-26
(Tex. 2002). We note that the trier of fact is the sole judge
of the credibility of the witnesses at trial and that we are
not at liberty to disturb the determinations of the trier of
fact as long as those determinations are not unreasonable.
J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573.
With
respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of
factors need be proved. In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d
261, 266 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2010, pet. denied). But courts
may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape
their analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367,
371-72 (Tex. 1976). These include, but are not limited to,
(1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical
needs of the child now and in the future, (3) the emotional
and physical danger to the child now and in the future, (4)
the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody,
(5) the programs available to assist these individuals to
promote the best interest of the child, (6) the plans for the
child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody,
(7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the
acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that the
existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one, and
(9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.
Id. Additionally, evidence that proves one or more
statutory grounds for termination may also constitute
evidence illustrating that termination is in the child's
best interest. C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.
Evidence
and Analysis
With
respect to Appellant's contention that there is no
evidence to support the trial court's findings, we begin
with evidence related to Appellant's conviction for
injury to a child. To support a finding under subsection (Q),
the record must show that the parent will be incarcerated or
confined and unable to care for the child for at least two
years from the date the petition for termination was filed.
Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(Q); In re H.R.M.,
209 S.W.3d 105, 110 (Tex. 2006). The petition to terminate
Appellant's parental rights was filed on May 14, 2018.
Thus, the two-year period required by subsection (Q) would
end in May 2020. At the final hearing on termination, the
trial court admitted into evidence, as Exhibit No. 1, a
certified copy of a judgment of conviction. The exhibit
reflects that Appellant entered an open plea and was
convicted of the offense of "INJURY CHILD/
ELDERLY/DISABLE W/INT BODILY INJ." The judgment also
indicates that Appellant was sentenced on April 16, 2014, to
a term of confinement for eight years. Appellant's
projected release date is September 23, 2021, a date that is
well after the two-year period required by subsection (Q).
Furthermore,
the testimony from the final hearing in this cause reflects
that the above judgment of conviction stemmed from charges in
which Appellant injured J.E.D. J.E.D.'s mother testified
that Appellant hurt J.E.D. when J.E.D. was almost four years
old. According to the mother, Appellant "picked [J.E.D.]
up by his penis," which resulted in a "cut" at
the top part of J.E.D.'s penis from Appellant's
thumbnail and a "very bad cut on . . . the base of the
penis." After Head Start contacted CPS, law enforcement
investigated and charged Appellant with injury to a child.
Appellant admitted that he had hurt J.E.D. and pleaded guilty
to the charge. Appellant remained incarcerated for that
offense and appeared via telephone at the final hearing on
termination.
The
record also reflects that Appellant's actions caused
emotional trauma to J.E.D., that J.E.D. still has nightmares
and depression, that J.E.D. is scared of Appellant, and that
J.E.D. says he "hates" ...