JOSEPH K. WATTS, RACHEL WATTS, ALEXANDRIA SMITH, AND SCOTT EDWARD SMITH, Appellants
v.
STEWART A. FELDMAN, INDIVIDUALLY, THE FELDMAN LAW FIRM LLP, RSL-3B-IL, L.P., RSL-3B-IL MANAGEMENT CORP., RSL-5B-IL MANAGEMENT CORP., RSL-5B-IL, L.P., RSL SPECIAL MANAGEMENT CORP., AND RSL-SPECIAL IV, L.P., Appellees
On
Appeal from the 55th District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2016-51163
Panel
consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Zimmerer and
Hassan.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER
CURIAM
In this
post-judgment action, judgment creditors asserted
fraudulent-transfer claims against the judgment debtors and
others. A defendant then filed counterclaims and requested
various sanctions against the judgment creditors. The trial
court granted the judgment creditors' motion to dismiss
the entire case as moot. Because the appellants have not met
the briefing requirements necessary to challenge on appeal
one of the grounds in this motion, we affirm.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
In May
2009, appellants/plaintiffs Stewart A. Feldman, individually,
The Feldman Law Firm LLP, RSL-3B-IL, L.P., RSL-3B-IL
Management Corp., RSL-5B-IL Management Corp., RSL-5B-IL,
L.P., RSL Special Management Corp., RSL-Special IV, L.P.
(collectively the "Feldman Parties") and others
secured a judgment against Joseph K. Watts, Angela M. Watts,
and Joseph K. Watts, P.C. (the "Judgment").
In
August 2016, the Feldman Parties filed suit in the trial
court below against appellants/defendants Joseph K. Watts,
Rachel Watts, Alexandria Smith, and Scott Edward Smith
(collectively the "Watts Parties") and others,
asserting claims under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act and alleging a conspiracy to commit violations of the
Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. The Feldman Parties
also asserted a claim under section 42.004 of the Texas
Property Code.
Rachel
Watts, Alexandria Smith, and Scott E. Smith answered and
sought to recover reasonable and necessary attorney's
fees. Joseph Watts answered and requested reasonable and
necessary attorney's fees, as well as sanctions under
chapter 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13. Joseph Watts also asserted
various counterclaims against the Feldman Parties.
The
Feldman Parties moved to dismiss the entire case, asserting
that if Joseph Watts followed through with the procedure
outlined in a September 7, 2017 order, then all issues in the
case would become moot (the "Mootness Ground"). On
this ground, the Feldman Parties urged the trial court to
declare this case moot and dismiss it. The trial court had
issued the September 7, 2017 order in a related garnishment
action. In that order, the trial court provided that Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. might deposit the proceeds of a June 9, 2017
check into the registry of the court and that if Wells Fargo
did so, Wells Fargo would be released and the garnishment
would be "lifted." The Feldman Parties asserted
that if Joseph Watts followed this procedure, the matters in
this fraudulent-transfer case would become moot and ripe for
dismissal.
The
final order in this case consists of two orders the trial
court signed at the same time on September 21, 2017 (the
"Final Order"). In the Final Order, the trial court
noted that the funds had been paid into the registry of the
court and that these funds would be released to the Feldman
Parties. The trial court granted the Feldman Parties'
motion to dismiss, finding that this matter had become moot
and no longer presented a case or controversy. Based on this
conclusion, the trial court dismissed this case. The trial
court implicitly granted the motion to dismiss based on the
Mootness Ground. The Watts Parties have appealed from the
Final Order dismissing this case as moot.
II.
Analysis
On
appeal, the Watts Parties assert various issues, including
"Did the trial court err by dismissing [Joseph
Watts's] claims?" The Watts Parties note in their
appellate brief that the trial court dismissed this case as
moot. They also assert that the trial court erred in
dismissing their claims against the Feldman Parties. We
conclude that these statements suffice to assign error as to
the trial court's dismissal of this case as moot.
An
appellant must assign error and present argument supported by
adequate briefing. See Energy Maintenance Servs. Group I,
LLC v. Sandt, 401 S.W.3d 204, 220-21 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied). Failure to so can operate as
a forfeiture of the point on appeal. See id.;
Equity Industrial Ltd. P'ship IV v. Southern
Worldwide Logistics, LLC, No. 14-14-00750-CV, 2016 WL
1267848, at *2-*3 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 31,
2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). The Watts Parties filed a lengthy
appellate brief, yet in the argument section of their brief
they mention mootness only twice. In the statement-of-facts
section of their brief, the Watts Parties note that the trial
court dismissed this case as moot, and then state that
"[c]ertainly [the Feldman Parties'] meritless
TUFTA[1]claims were moot; [the Watts Parties] had
pending counterclaims." In the argument section of their
brief, the Watts Parties twice refer to the Feldman
Parties' having sought dismissal of all of the
parties' claims for mootness. Even under a liberal
reading of these references, we cannot conclude that they
meet the briefing standards.
The
Watts Parties do not state or discuss any legal standard
under which courts determine whether a case has become moot.
They do not cite any case analyzing a mootness issue. They do
not assert that the counterclaims or the requests for
sanctions still presented a case or controversy. Nor do they
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