United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Galveston Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JEFFREY VINCENT BROWN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff
Ryan Rydell Bonner, an inmate in the Galveston County Jail,
proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. He
has filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
violations of his civil rights. Because this case is governed
by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the
Court is required to scrutinize the pleadings and dismiss the
complaint in whole or in part if it is frivolous, malicious,
or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. After reviewing all of the pleadings
as required, the Court determines that this case should be
STAYED for reasons that follow.
I.
BACKGROUND
Bonner
filed this suit on August 9, 2019, against four defendants:
Galveston County District Attorney Jack Roady and Galveston
Police Department officers Brian A. Pearcy, J. Melancon, and
C. Simmons. He states that Pearcy arrested him on June 12,
2019, at a private residence in Galveston. Bonner claims
“unreasonable seizures” of his person from his
residence and alleges that he was not given “any
rights” or “notified of the accusations”
(Dkt. 1, at 4). He alleges that Melancon “assist[ed] in
the claims” (id.). He further alleges that
Simmons, a supervisory officer, and District Attorney Roady
engaged in a “criminal conspiracy” of perjury and
that Roady “made up” a public intoxication charge
during probable-cause proceedings (id. at 3-4).
Publicly
available online records show that a criminal case currently
is pending against Bonner in the 122nd District Court of
Galveston County. See State of Texas v. Ryan Rydell
Bonner, Case No. 19-CR-1881 (available at
http://publicaccess.co.galveston.tx.us/default.aspx) (last
visited Oct. 30, 2019). Documents accessible through the
website reflect that Bonner was arrested on June 12, 2019, by
Officer B. Pearcy, and that a magistrate entered a
probable-cause finding and set bond that same day. On
September 5, 2019, a grand jury returned an indictment
against Bonner for obstruction or retaliation, in particular,
“intentionally and knowingly threaten[ing] to
harm” Pearcy. The trial court has appointed counsel to
represent Bonner and a status conference is set for November
8, 2019 (id.).
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As
required by the PLRA, the Court screens this case to
determine whether the action is frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In reviewing the
pleadings, the Court is mindful of the fact that Plaintiff
proceeds pro se. Complaints filed by pro se
litigants are entitled to a liberal construction and,
“however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Even
under this lenient standard a pro se plaintiff must
allege more than “‘labels and conclusions' or
a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); see Patrick v. Wal-Mart,
Inc., 681 F.3d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 2012).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation
omitted). Additionally, regardless of how well-pleaded the
factual allegations may be, they must demonstrate that the
plaintiff is entitled to relief under a valid legal theory.
See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989);
McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir.
1997).
III.
DISCUSSION
Bonner's
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims that his
constitutional rights were violated in connection with an
arrest and criminal proceeding in Galveston County. He sues
the Galveston County district attorney and three police
officers. He does not request any specific relief, monetary
or otherwise, from this Court (Dkt. 1, at 4).
Under
Heck v. Humphrey, a claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 that bears a relationship to a conviction or sentence is
not cognizable unless the conviction or sentence has been
invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87
(1994). To recover damages based on allegations of
“harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render
a conviction or sentence invalid, ” a civil rights
plaintiff must prove “that the conviction or sentence
has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to
make such determinations, or called into question by a
federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
[under] 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Id. If a
judgment in favor of a civil rights plaintiff “would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence, ” then the complaint “must be dismissed
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or
sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. at
487.
Public
court records do not reflect, and Bonner does not claim, that
his conviction or sentence in No. 19-CR-1881 has been
invalidated or otherwise set aside. To the contrary, Bonner
has not yet been tried on the charges against him. However,
his allegations in this lawsuit would, if true, implicate the
validity of the pending criminal charges against him and any
conviction or sentence that might result. Therefore,
Heck precludes Bonner's claims under § 1983
until he can demonstrate that his conviction or sentence has
been invalidated. See Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d
186, 189-91 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc).[1]
The
Supreme Court has explained that, if a pretrial detainee such
as Bonner files civil-rights claims related to rulings that
will likely be made in a pending criminal proceeding, the
best practice is for the district court to stay the
civil-rights case until the pending criminal case is
resolved. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94
(2007); see Hopkins v. Ogg, __ Fed.Appx. __, 2019 WL
3761360, at *3 & n.20 (5th Cir. Aug. 8, 2019) (citing
Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir.
1995)). The Court therefore will stay and administratively
close this case until the criminal proceedings against Bonner
in No. 19-CR-1881, including any future appeal, are resolved.
If Bonner ultimately is convicted, Heck will require
dismissal of any claims in this lawsuit that would imply the
invalidity of his conviction until the Heck
conditions are met. See Johnson v. McElveen, 101
F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that claims barred
by Heck are “dismissed with prejudice to their
being asserted again until the Heck conditions are
met”). If Bonner is not convicted, this lawsuit may
proceed, absent some other bar to suit. See Wallace,
549 U.S. at 394.
If
Bonner seeks to proceed with this suit after the criminal
proceedings have concluded, he is instructed to file a motion
to reinstate this case within 30
days of the state-court judgment. Failure to
file a timely motion to reinstate could waive Bonner's
opportunity to proceed with this civil action.
IV.
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