Court of Appeals of Texas, Seventh District, Amarillo
On
Appeal from the 415th District Court Parker County, Texas,
Trial Court No. CV18-0071; Honorable Graham Quisenberry,
Presiding
Before
QUINN, C.J. and PIRTLE and PARKER, J.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Patrick A. Pirtle Justice.
Appellant,
Cypress Drilling, LLC, appeals the trial court's order
dismissing its petition seeking an order to compel
arbitration with Appellee, Medve Energy Ventures, LLC, based
upon the trial court's lack of subject matter
jurisdiction over Cypress's petition.[1] In a single
issue, Cypress asserts that the trial court erred in denying
its motion to compel and dismissing its petition for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm the trial court's
order.
Background
In
January 2018, Cypress filed its Original Petition and
Motion to Compel Arbitration between Cypress and Medve
pursuant to a Participation Agreement executed in 2016 by the
two parties ("contract"). The contract required
that "[t]he legal relations among the parties shall be
governed and construed in accordance with the laws of the
State of Louisiana." The arbitration clause in the
contract also required the following:
All disputes between the Parties hereto with respect to any
provision of this Agreement or rights and obligations of any
Party hereunder (other than disputes involving allegations of
intentional fraud), which cannot be resolved by mutual
agreement, will be resolved by binding arbitration in
accordance with the Rules of the American Arbitration
Association in Lafayette, Louisiana[, ] or by any other means
of alternative dispute resolution mutually agreed upon by the
parties.
Cypress's
petition sought to resolve "disputes" between it
and Medve regarding their respective obligations under the
contract. That is, Cypress sought a declaration that the
contract did not contain any of the requirements that Medve
was seeking to impose on Cypress under the contract. The
petition neither described any disputes with Medve nor
indicated any provisions of the contract in dispute. In its
motion, Cypress sought an order compelling the parties to
arbitrate and abate the case until such time as an arbitrator
has decided any issues.
In
March 2018, Medve filed a motion to dismiss Cypress's
petition for forum non conveniens.[2] In its motion,
Medve asserted that Louisiana was the most convenient forum
to litigate the parties' claims based on the contract
because there was pending litigation related to the contract
between the two parties in federal court in Louisiana.
Also,
in March 2018, the trial court held a hearing to decide
Medve's motion to dismiss. At the hearing, Cypress
represented that the parties had agreed to arbitrating their
dispute in Louisiana and that the dispute would be resolved
in Louisiana. By its motion, Cypress also represented that it
merely sought an order to compel the parties to arbitrate and
would not be seeking a final judgment from the trial court in
Texas. At the hearing's conclusion, the trial court
interpreted Medve's motion to dismiss as a motion
challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the court and
dismissed the case because it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction.
Standard
of Review
We
review an order denying a motion to compel arbitration under
an abuse of discretion standard. Bonded Builders Home
Warranty Ass'n of Tex. v. Smith, 488 S.W.3d 468, 476
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2016, no pet.). Under this standard of
review, we defer to the trial court's factual
determinations if they are supported by the evidence, but we
review the trial court's legal determinations de
novo. In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d
640, 643 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding). We also view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's
ruling and defer to the trial court's resolution of
conflicting evidence. INEOS Group, Ltd. v. Chevron
Phillips Chem. Co., LP, 312 S.W.3d 843, 848 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). When written
findings of fact are not requested or filed, as here, we
affirm the ruling if it can be upheld on any legal theory
reasonably supported by the evidence; Tex. Dep't of
Pub. Safety v. Wilmoth, 83 S.W.3d 929, 931 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (citing In re W.E.R.,
669 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Tex. 1984) (per curiam)), and we reverse
a trial court for abusing its discretion only when we
determine the court acted in an unreasonable or arbitrary
manner, meaning that it acted without reference to any
guiding rules and principles. Jackson v. Bell, 484
S.W.3d 161, 166 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2015, no pet.) (citing
Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.3d
238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985)).
Subject
matter jurisdiction is essential for a court to have the
authority to resolve a case. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v.
Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638-39 (Tex. 1999). Whether a trial
court has subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry
that can be addressed by the court sua sponte and at
any time. Montenegro v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC,
419 S.W.3d 561, 567 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2013, pet. denied)
(citing Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922,
928 (Tex. 1998)). Review of subject matter jurisdiction is a
question of law, and we review ...