Court of Appeals of Texas, Ninth District, Beaumont
Submitted on October 2, 2019
On
Appeal from the 258th District Court Polk County, Texas Trial
Cause No. CIV32431
Before
McKeithen, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
STEVE
MCKEITHEN, CHIEF JUSTICE
Pro
se appellant Kail Edward Gibson appeals from the trial
court's dismissal of his lawsuit pursuant to Chapter 14
of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§
14.001-.014. Gibson raises three issues for our
consideration. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
Gibson,
an inmate in the Pack Unit, filed a pro se due
course of law complaint against appellees, seeking a
declaration that the appellees violated his constitutional
rights and a permanent injunction ordering the appellees to
comply with the due course of law and admit to violating the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
("HIPAA") by illegally obtaining his mental health
records. Gibson alleged that William Lee Hon, the District
Attorney of Polk County, Texas, violated his constitutional
rights by obtaining his mental health records without his
consent or providing him notice. Gibson alleged that the
Honorable Robert Hill Trapp, Judge of the 411th District
Court of Polk County, Texas, violated his constitutional
rights by admitting the mental health records during his
trial.
The
trial judge signed an order dismissing, without prejudice,
Gibson's claims as frivolous because the pleadings failed
to state a cause of action. In its order, the trial court
found that the disclosure of medical records under HIPAA was
permissible when the information was disclosed for law
enforcement purposes and obtained pursuant to a grand jury
subpoena. Gibson appealed.
ANALYISIS
In
issue one, Gibson complains that he was denied due process
when the trial court dismissed his complaint as frivolous
without conducting a hearing. In issue two, Gibson argues
that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing his
claim as frivolous based on its finding that the disclosure
of medical records under HIPAA was permissible, because his
claim does not involve medical records. According to Gibson,
his claim involves mental health records which contain his
confidential communications with a mental health
professional. In issue three, Gibson complains that the court
abused its discretion by concealing his privileged mental
health records when it decided to deny his claim without
conducting a hearing, thereby denying him an opportunity to
prove that the records were not ordinary medical records.
We
review the trial court's dismissal of an inmate's
claim pursuant to Chapter 14 under an abuse of discretion
standard. Thomas v. Knight, 52 S.W.3d 292, 294 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denied). We will affirm the
trial court's dismissal if it was proper under any legal
theory. Hamilton v. Pechacek, 319 S.W.3d 801, 809
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (citing Johnson v.
Lynaugh, 796 S.W.2d 705, 706-07 (Tex. 1990)). In forma
pauperis suits by inmates, such as Gibson's lawsuit, are
governed by Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
Ann. §§ 14.001-14.014. A court may dismiss a claim
brought under Chapter 14 if it is frivolous. See id.
§ 14.003(a)(2). In considering the purposes of Chapter
14, the trial court's discretion to dismiss claims is
broad. Jackson v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice-Inst.
Div., 28 S.W.3d 811, 813 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000,
pet. denied). In making its determination of whether a claim
is frivolous, a trial court may consider whether a claim has
an arguable basis in law or in fact. Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(b)(2). Chapter 14 states that
the trial court may hold a hearing to decide whether a claim
should be dismissed. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§ 14.003(c).
In most
cases, a trial court cannot dismiss an in forma pauperis
lawsuit based on a determination that the lawsuit lacks an
arguable basis in fact without having a fact hearing. In
re Wilson, 932 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996,
no writ). However, if the lawsuit lacks an arguable basis in
law, the trial court can dismiss a claim without conducting a
hearing. McDonald v. Houston Dairy, 813 S.W.2d 238,
239 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ.). When a
trial court dismisses a claim without conducting a hearing,
our review focuses on whether the inmate's claim has no
basis in law, which is a question of law that we review
de novo. Sawyer v. Tex. Dep't of Crim.
Justice, 983 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). In conducting our review, we take
the allegations in the inmate's petition as true and
review the types of relief and causes of action set out in
the petition to determine whether, as a matter of law, the
petition states a cause of action that would authorize
relief. Leachman v. Dretke, 261 S.W.3d 297, 304
(Tex. App.- Fort Worth 2008, no pet.). "A claim has no
arguable basis in law if it is an indisputably meritless
legal theory." Id.
Because
the trial court did not conduct a hearing before it dismissed
Gibson's lawsuit, the issue before us is whether the
trial court properly determined that there was no basis in
law for Gibson's claims. See id. The trial court
dismissed Gibson's claims because it found that the
disclosure of Gibson's medical records was permissible,
because the records were obtained pursuant to a grand jury
subpoena and disclosed for law enforcement purposes. In issue
two, Gibson argues that the trial court erred by finding that
the disclosure of medical records under HIPAA was
permissible, because his claim does not involve medical
records. According to Gibson, his claim involves mental
health records which contain his confidential communications
with a mental health professional.
The
appellees argue that the rules of evidence concerning the
privileged nature of records pertaining to the diagnosis or
treatment of mental health patients that Gibson cites to in
his petition apply to civil cases, and Gibson's
underlying case is criminal in nature. See Tex. R.
Evid. 509, 510. According to the appellees, Rule 509(b)
clearly states that in a criminal case, there is no
physician-patient privilege; however, a confidential
communication is not admissible in a criminal case if it was
made to a person involved in the treatment of or examination
for alcohol or drug abuse and by a person being treated
voluntarily for admission to treatment for alcohol or drug
abuse. See Tex. R. Evid. 509(b). The appellees
maintain that because the records at issue did not involve
the treatment of or examination ...