United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
LUIS MANUEL HERNANDEZ, GILBERTO HERNANDEZ, and all others similarly situated under 29 U.S.C. § 216b, Plaintiffs,
ARC TRADING COMPANY, WENRU YOU a/k/a ANN YOU, HARVEST GRANDE INTERNATIONAL, LLC, and YONGFENG LI a/k/a VINCENT LI, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
L. HORAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
ARC Trading Company (“ARC”) and Wenru You a/k/a
Ann You (collectively, the “ARC Defendants”) have
filed a motion for partial summary judgment. See
Dkt. No. 79. Plaintiffs Luis Manuel Hernandez
(“Luis”) and Gilberto Hernandez (“Gilberto)
have filed a response, see Dkt. No. 88, and the ARC
Defendants have filed a reply, see Dkt. No. 91.
Harvest Grande International, LLC (“Harvest
Grande”) and Yongfeng Li a/k/a Vincent Li
(“Li”) (collectively, the “Harvest Grande
Defendants”) have filed a motion for summary judgment.
See Dkt. No. 82. Plaintiffs have filed a response,
see Dkt. No. 86, and the Harvest Grande Defendants
have filed a reply, see Dkt. No. 92.
following reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in
part the ARC Defendants' motion for partial summary
judgment and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Harvest
Grande Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
assert claims for overtime pay violations under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), see 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-219, against the ARC Defendants and
for successor liability against the Harvest Grande
worked for ARC as a warehouseman/driver from December 15,
2011 until August 2014 and from December 2014 until July 15,
2017. See Dkt. No. 49 at 3, 6; Dkt. No. 81 at 6-10.
He alleges that he worked an average of 67 hours per week,
for which he was paid an average straight time rate of $11.75
per hour, but that he was never paid any overtime wages.
See Dkt. No. 49 at 6 (Second Amended Complaint);
Dkt. No. 81 at 2-5, 11-16.
worked for ARC as a warehouseman from January 2013 until
March 2015. See Dkt. No. 49 at 4, 6; Dkt. No. 81 at
20-23. He alleges that he worked an average of 60 hours per
week, for which he was paid an average straight time rate of
$7.80 per hour, but that he was never paid overtime wages.
See Dkt. No. 49 at 6; Dkt. No. 81 at 24-25.
filed his original complaint on August 3, 2017 seeking
overtime wages from the ARC Defendants under the FLSA for
himself and all other similarly-situated individuals.
See Dkt. No. 1. Gilberto filed his Notice of Filing
Opt-In Consent Form on September 29, 2017. See Dkt.
No. 8. The Court granted Luis's motion to ratify the
opt-in notice on December 22, 2017. See Dkt. No. 29.
February 1, 2018, You transferred 100% of the shares of ARC
to Harvest Grande. See Dkt. No. 84 at 28-30. The
Shareholder Interest Transfer Agreement contains a liability
and indemnification clause in which You agrees to be liable
for any claims arising prior to the sale. See Dkt.
No. 84 at 28-29.
amended their complaint to add the Harvest Grande Defendants
under the doctrine of successor liability. See Dkt.
Defendants seek partial summary judgment limiting
Plaintiffs' damages to the maximum amount allowed under
the FLSA's three-year statute of limitations under a
formula based on a monthly average of wages instead of the
traditional weekly-average formula.
Harvest Grande Defendants seek summary judgment under the
liability and indemnification clause of the purchase
Court now determines that the ARC Defendants' motion for
partial summary judgment should be granted in part and denied
in part and the Harvest Grande Defendants' motion for
summary judgment should be granted in part and denied in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is
proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A
factual “issue is material if its resolution could
affect the outcome of the action.” Weeks Marine,
Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 233, 235
(5th Cir. 2003). “A factual dispute is
‘genuine,' if the evidence is such that a
reasonable [trier of fact] could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Crowe v. Henry, 115 F.3d
294, 296 (5th Cir. 1997).
moving party seeks summary judgment as to his opponent's
claims or defenses, “[t]he moving party bears the
initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings
and discovery in the record that it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact, but is not
required to negate elements of the nonmoving party's
case.” Lynch Props., Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co.,
140 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998). “Summary judgment
must be granted against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party's case, and on which it will bear the
burden of proof at trial. If the moving party fails to meet
this initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of
the nonmovant's response.” Pioneer Expl.,
L.L.C. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 767 F.3d 503, 511 (5th
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must
set forth” - and submit evidence of - “specific
facts showing a genuine issue for trial and not rest upon the
allegations or denials contained in its pleadings.”
Lynch Props., 140 F.3d at 625; Little v. Liquid
Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc);
accord Pioneer Expl., 767 F.3d at 511 (“[T]he
nonmovant cannot rely on the allegations in the pleadings
alone” but rather “must go beyond the ...