United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
the Court is Petitioner Ronald Gene Grizzle, Jr.'s Motion
for Relief Pursuant to Federal Rule 60b(6) [ECF No. 11],
the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the U.S.
Magistrate Judge (the "Findings and Conclusions")
[ECF No. 12], and Petitioner's Objection to the
Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (the
"Objections") [ECF No. 18]. For the reasons that
follow, the Court overrules the Objections and accepts the
Findings and Conclusions of the Magistrate Judge.
objects to the Findings and Conclusions of the Magistrate
Judge, arguing that: (1) "his legal mater[i]al work was
destroyed by [the] guards"; (2) "he did not
understand the time [within which he needed to file his
habeas petition], or how important it was to try and get his
records"; (3) he did not understand "the one-year
time limitation" for his habeas petition; (4) he
encountered delays in gathering the relevant information for
his petition; and (5) "he just didn't have the
mental capacity ... to obtain help with his filing, or an
understanding of the [relevant] limitations" period.
Obj. 1-3. Petitioner's objections, however, have largely
been addressed by the Magistrate Judge.
the Court accepts the Findings and Conclusions insofar as
they reject Petitioner's argument that he is entitled to
equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period under
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA"), due to his alleged mental incompetency
or lack of understanding of the relevant limitations period.
Petitioner's ignorance of the relevant limitations period
does not support equitable tolling of AEDPA. See Felder
v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 -72 (5th Cir. 2000). While
mental incompetency may support equitable tolling, see
Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 715 (5th Cir. 1999), a
"petitioner (i) must make a threshold showing of
incompetence and (ii) must show that this incompetence
affected his ability to file a timely habeas petition."
Jones v. Stephens, 541 Fed.Appx. 499, 505 (5th Cir.
2013). In this case, Petitioner alleged his mental
incompetence, but provided no evidence in support of this
claim. In fact, Petitioner filed multiple articulate briefs
in this case, which evidences his mental competence. See
generally, e.g., Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Writ of
Flabeas Corpus; Obj. Regardless, aside from Petitioner's
conclusory allegations-which are insufficient to warrant the
equitable tolling of AEDPA's limitations period, see,
e.g., Smith v. Kelly, 301 Fed.Appx. 375, 378 (5th Cir.
2008)-the record contains no evidence of Petitioner's
mental incompetence. Consequently, the Court adopts the
Findings and Conclusions that Petitioner has failed to
demonstrate that his condition was "the type of
extraordinary circumstance that entitled him equitable
tolling, and therefore [merited] Rule 60(b)(6) relief."
Smith v. Johnson, No. 00-10019, 2001 WL 43520, at *1
(5th Cir. Jan. 3, 2001).
Court further overrules Petitioner's objections that he
is entitled to Rule 60(b)(6) relief because prison guards
destroyed his materials or because he encountered delays in
gathering the relevant information. The alleged loss of his
legal materials and delays in gathering information do not
rise to the level of extraordinary circumstances that would
warrant equitable tolling of AEDPA. See Madis v.
Edwards, 347 Fed.Appx. 106, 108 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding
that transfers between units, separation from legal
materials, and administrative segregation were not rare or
exceptional circumstances meriting equitable tolling);
Lozano v. Thaler, C.A. No. C-12-34, 2012 WL 2026700,
at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 14, 2012) (finding that a petitioner was
not excused from filing a petition late even if his legal
documents were lost). In fact, nothing prevented Petitioner
from advising the Court of his inability to obtain pertinent
information or of the destruction of his materials. See
Pina v. Stephens, Civ. A. No. 2:15-CV-78, 2015 WL
7820493, at M (S.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2015). Accordingly, the
Court finds that Petitioner did not meet his burden of
showing that the circumstances of this case are so
exceptional that they warrant Rule 60(b)(6) relief.
after reviewing all relevant matters of record in this case,
including the Findings and Conclusions, and Petitioner's
objections thereto in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1), the Court finds that the Findings and Conclusions
are correct and accepts them as the Findings and Conclusions
of the Court. For the reasons stated above and in the
Findings and Conclusions, the Court denies Petitioner's
Motion for Relief Pursuant to Federal Rule 60b(6).
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6)
allows a court to relieve a party of a final judgment for
"any other reason that justifies relief." Rule
60(b)(6) is "a residual clause used to cover unforeseen
contingencies; that is, it is a means for accomplishing
justice in exceptional circumstances." Steverson v.
GlobalSantaFe Corp.,508 F.3d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Stipelcovich v. Sand Dollar Marine, Inc.,805 F.2d 599, 604-05 (5th Cir. 1986)). The party seeking
relief has the burden of showing that the requirements of
Rule 60(b)(6) are met. See Lavespere v. Niagara Mack
& Tool Works, Inc.,910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir.