APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN CAUSE. NO.
314483-C IN THE 185TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FROM HARRIS
Keller, P.J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which
Keasler, Hervey, Richardson, Yeary, Keel, Walker and
Slaughter, JJ., joined. Newell, J., did not
habeas proceeding, Applicant seeks to be exempted from the
death penalty on the ground that he is intellectually
disabled. The habeas court agreed with Applicant, citing what
it considered to be the contemporary standards for an
intellectual disability diagnosis.
disagreed with the habeas court for a variety of reasons
falling within two overarching categories: (1) because the
habeas court failed to follow standards set out in our
caselaw,  and (2) because the habeas court failed to
consider, or unreasonably disregarded, "a vast array of
evidence in this lengthy record that cannot rationally be
squared with a finding of intellectual
disability." The caselaw standards upon which we relied
were originally promulgated in our decision in Ex parte
Briseno. With respect to an evaluation of adaptive
deficits, Briseno set forth a number of factors to
our decision, the Supreme Court concluded that some of the
standards in our caselaw did not comport with the Eighth
Amendment's requirements regarding an intellectual
disability determination. The Supreme Court was especially
critical of the Briseno factors.
remand, we accepted the Supreme Court's directive to rely
upon contemporary standards and adopted the framework set
forth in the DSM-5, the most recent edition of the
We also expressly abandoned reliance on the Briseno
factors. Nevertheless, after further analysis, we
concluded "that Applicant has failed to show adaptive
deficits sufficient to support a diagnosis of intellectual
Supreme Court again granted certiorari to review our
decision. The Supreme Court criticized our
decision as continuing to engage in types of analysis that it
had previously found wanting. Although the Supreme Court
found "sentences here and there suggesting other modes
of analysis consistent with" its directives, it found
that there were "also sentences here and there
suggesting reliance upon what [it] had earlier called
'lay stereotypes of the intellectually
disabled.'"The Supreme Court further concluded,
"on the basis of the trial court record," that
"Moore has shown he is a person with intellectual
last conclusion of the Supreme Court is determinative. Having
concluded that Applicant is a person with intellectual
disability that is exempt from the death penalty, the Supreme
Court has resolved Applicant's claim in his
favor. There is nothing left for us to do but
to implement the Supreme Court's holding. Accordingly, we
reform Applicant's sentence of death to a sentence of
 Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d
481, 486-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), vacated by Moore v.
Texas, 137 S.Ct. 1039 (2017).
 Id. at 489.
135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App.