the 19th District Court McLennan County, Texas Trial Court
Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Neill.
GRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE.
Terrell Landrum was convicted of theft of property valued at
$2, 500 or more but less than $30, 000, a state jail felony.
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(a), (e)(4)(A).
He was sentenced to 18 months in a state jail facility.
Because the evidence of value was sufficient to support the
conviction and Landrum was not egregiously harmed by charge
error, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
Khoi Nguyen and his family were in the process of relocating
out-of-state, their house was burglarized and much of their
belongings were stolen. Landrum was identified as a suspect
because he was selling some of the property on social media.
A search warrant of Landrum's residence was issued and
several pieces of property belonging to the Nguyen's were
recovered from Landrum's residence. At trial, Landrum
claimed to have not known the property was stolen.
of the Evidence
first issue, Landrum complains the evidence is insufficient
to support his conviction because the State did not prove
value of the property alleged to have been stolen.
Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed our standard of
review of a sufficiency issue as follows:
When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, we consider whether, after viewing all of the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61
L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227,
232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). This standard requires the
appellate court to defer "to the responsibility of the
trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony,
to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from
basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson, 443
U.S. at 319. We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute
our judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams v.
State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The
court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage in a
"divide and conquer" strategy but must consider the
cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa, 514
S.W.3d at 232. Although juries may not speculate about the
meaning of facts or evidence, juries are permitted to draw
any reasonable inferences from the facts so long as each
inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial.
Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex. Crim. App.
2016) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319); see
also Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16-17 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007). We presume that the factfinder resolved any
conflicting inferences from the evidence in favor of the
verdict, and we defer to that resolution. Merritt v.
State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). This
is because the jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts,
the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given
to the testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893,
899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Direct evidence and
circumstantial evidence are equally probative, and
circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to uphold a
conviction so long as the cumulative force of all the
incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the
conviction. Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809
(Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was
sufficient to support a conviction by comparing it to
"the elements of the offense as defined by the
hypothetically correct jury charge for the case."
Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997). The hypothetically correct jury charge is one that
"accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the
indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's
burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's
theories of liability, and adequately describes the
particular offense for which the defendant was tried."
Id.; see also Daugherty v. State, 387
S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The "law as
authorized by the indictment" includes the statutory
elements of the offense and those elements as modified by the
indictment. Daugherty, 387 S.W.3d at 665.
Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732-33 (Tex. Crim.
person commits the state jail felony offense of theft if the
person unlawfully appropriates property with intent to
deprive the owner of property and the value of the property
stolen is $2, 500 or more but less than $30, 000. Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 31.03(a), (e)(4)(A). When the proof of value
is given by a non-owner, the non-owner must be qualified as
to his knowledge of the value of the property and must give
testimony explicitly as to the fair market value or
replacement value of the property. Sullivan v.
State, 701 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Fair
market value means the amount the property would sell for in
cash, given a reasonable time for selling it. Keeton v.
State, 803 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
when the owner of the property testifies as to the value of
the property, the owner may testify as to his opinion or
estimate of the value of the property in general and in
commonly understood terms. Sullivan, 701 S.W.2d at
909. Testimony of this nature is an offer of the witness'
best knowledge of the value of the property. Id.
Such testimony will constitute sufficient evidence for the
trier of fact to decide value based on the witness'
credibility. Id. This is true even in the absence of
a specific statement as to "market value" or
"replacement value." Id. Further, when an
owner testifies, there is a presumption that the owner is
testifying to an estimation of the fair market value.
Id.; Trammell v. State, 511 S.W.2d 951, 954
(Tex. Crim. App. 1974). The owner may reasonably ...