IN THE INTEREST OF J.G. AND A.P., CHILDREN
the 74th District Court McLennan County, Texas Trial Court
Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Neill
E. NEILL, JUSTICE
issues, appellant, Augustine Perez, challenges the trial
court's order, entered after a bench trial, terminating
his parental rights to J.G. and A.P. Specifically, Perez contends
that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to
support the predicate grounds for termination under sections
161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) of the Family Code. See
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D)-(E) (West Supp.
2018). We affirm as modified.
termination order, the trial court stated that the predicate
grounds for termination of Perez's parental rights as
sections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), and (O) of the Family
Code and that termination of Perez's parental rights is
in the best interest of the children. See id. §
161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O). On appeal, Perez only
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to the
predicate grounds for termination under sections
161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) of the Family Code.
the Department, represented by the Criminal District Attorney
for McLennan County, Texas, filed a letter brief conceding
that the findings under section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) of
the Family Code "should be removed from the final order
terminating Appellant Augustine Perez's parental
rights." Because appellee agrees that Perez is entitled
to the relief requested, and because appellee has waived any
complaint pertaining to sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) of
the Family Code, we sustain Perez's issues on appeal to
the extent that the parties agree that sections
161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) of the Family Code should be removed
from the trial court's order as predicate grounds for
termination. In sustaining Perez's issues on appeal, we
are simply accepting appellee's waiver and specifically
not reviewing the evidence for sufficiency to support these
predicate grounds. See, e.g., Menon v. Water Splash,
Inc., No. 14-14-00012-CV, 2018 Tex.App. LEXIS 194, at *8
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 9, 2018, no pet.)
("On the other hand, a litigant also can concede or
waive issues and arguments on appeal . . . .").
on the foregoing, we modify the trial court's termination
order to delete the findings under sections 161.001(b)(1)(D)
and (E) of the Family Code. Given that Perez does not
challenge the remaining two predicate grounds for termination
of his parental rights under section 161.001 of the Family
Code or the best-interest grounds, we otherwise affirm the
trial court's termination order in all other respects.
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b) (stating
that in an involuntary termination proceeding, the Texas
Department of Family and Protective Services must establish:
(1) at least one ground under subsection (b)(1) of section
161.001; and (2) that termination is in the best interest of
the child); see also In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362
(Tex. 2003) ("Only one predicate finding under section
161.001[(b)](1) is necessary to support a judgment of
termination when there is also a finding that termination is
in the child's best interest.").
 In his notice of appeal, Perez
indicates that the style of this case is In the Interest
of J.G., A.P., and L.G., children. However, the record
reflects that Perez is not the father of L.G. and that his
parental rights were therefore terminated as to J.G. and A.P.
only. Neither the mother of all three of the children nor the
father of L.G. have filed notices of appeal in this matter.
Accordingly, we cannot construe Perez's notice of appeal
to encompass L.G. Without a proper notice of appeal, there is
nothing preserved for appellate review pertaining to L.G.
See Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(c) ("A party who seeks
to alter the trial court's judgment or other appealable
order must file a notice of appeal."); see also
Brooks v. Northglen Ass'n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 171 (Tex.
2004) ("Northglen did not file a notice of appeal from
the trial court's judgment, did not notice a
cross-appeal, and did not petition this court for review on
the point. Accordingly, Northglen did not preserve this issue
for our review."). Because there is not a proper notice
of appeal corresponding with L.G. in this proceeding, we
modify the style of this case to delete L.G.
 Perez does not challenge the trial
court's best-interest findings, nor does he challenge the
trial court's findings under sections 161.001(b)(1)(N)
and (O) of the Family Code. Therefore, the trial court's
best-interest findings, as well as the trial court's
findings under sections 161.001(b)(1)(N) and (O), are binding
on this Court, and we need not address them in this opinion.
See IKB Indus. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Pro-Line Corp., 938
S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex. 1997); McGalliard v. Kuhlmann,
722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986); see also In re
K.L.G., No. 14-09-00403-CV, 2009 Tex.App. LEXIS 8011, at
*7 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 15, 2009, no pet.)
(mem. op.) ("Appellant did not raise a challenge to the
predicate ground in subsection Q or to the best-interest
finding. Second, because they were unchallenged, findings
supporting termination of ...