United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
PATRICK BERNARD INGRAM (TDCJ No. 1669001), Plaintiff,
LORIE DAVIS, ET AL., Defendants.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
L. HORAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Patrick Bernard Ingram, a Texas prisoner, filed a pro
se complaint against state officials asserting that his
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection
have been violated based on the defendants' alleged
failure to honor a state court order expunging his arrest
records. See Dkt. Nos. 3 & 4.
October 31, 2019, the Court dismissed Ingram's complaint
with prejudice. See Dkt. Nos. 9, 13, & 14. On
November 18, 2019, Ingram moved the Court to reconsider its
judgment - contending that, in screening his claims, the
Court misconstrued them - and he further moved for leave to
amend his complaint [Dkt. No. 16] (the “Motion”).
United States District Judge Sam A. Lindsay referred the
Motion to the undersigned United States magistrate judge,
under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), for hearing, if necessary, and
to submit proposed findings and recommendations for
disposition of the motion. See Dkt. No. 17.
undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and recommendation that the Court deny the Motion.
Standards and Analysis
motion asking the court to reconsider a prior ruling is
evaluated either as a motion to ‘alter or amend a
judgment' under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 59(e)
or as a motion for ‘relief from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding' under [Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure] 60(b). The rule under which the motion is
considered is based on when the motion was filed.”
Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 702 F.3d 177, 182
n.2 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Tex. A&M
Research Found. v. Magna Transp., Inc., 338 F.3d 394,
400 (5th Cir. 2003)). If, like here, “the motion was
filed within twenty-eight days after the entry of the
judgment, the motion is treated as though it was filed under
Rule 59.” Id.; see also Hanna v.
Maxwell, 548 Fed.Appx. 192, 195 (5th Cir. 2013) (per
curiam) (“Hanna's pleadings at the district court
were not models of precision, but we construe them liberally
because he is proceeding pro se. However Hanna
labeled his motion, it clearly evinced a desire for the court
to reconsider its judgment, and it was filed within the
28-day time limit for filing Rule 59(e) motions.”
Under Rule 59(e), amending a judgment is appropriate (1)
where there has been an intervening change in the controlling
law; (2) where the movant presents newly discovered evidence
that was previously unavailable; or (3) to correct a manifest
error of law or fact. Schiller v. Physicians Res. Grp.
Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2003). A motion under
Rule 59 cannot be used to raise arguments or claims
“that could, and should, have been made before the
judgment issued.” Marseilles Homeowners Condo.
Ass'n v. Fidelity Nat. Ins. Co., 542 F.3d 1053, 1058
(5th Cir. 2008).
Demahy, 702 F.3d at 182 (footnote omitted).
“[i]n school yard parlance, ” a motion for
reconsideration is not “a request for a ‘do
over.'” Green v. City of New York, No.
05-cv-0429 (DLI)(ETB), 2006 WL 2516468, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.
29, 2006); see also Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. United
Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 972 F.Supp. 665, 674 (N.D.Ga.
1997) (“[A] motion for reconsideration is not an
opportunity for the moving party and their counsel to
instruct the court on how the court could have done it better
the first time.” (citation and internal quotation marks
has been no intervening change in controlling law. And Ingram
presents no previously-unavailable newly-discovered evidence.
So the Court should consider whether the judgment should be
amended to correct a manifest error of law. Indeed, this is
what Ingram appears to argue.
denying his due process claim, the Court concluded that,
because [Ingram] does not have a protected liberty interest
in parole, he cannot allege a plausible due process claim
based on his fear that a future parole determination may rely
on an expunged arrest. See Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110
F.3d 299, 308 & n.13 (5th Cir. 2001)
(“Johnson's allegations that the Board considers
unreliable or even false information in making parole
determinations, without more, simply do not assert a federal
constitutional violation. ... The underlying dispute on this
issue is whether (and if so, to what extent) a prisoner
enjoys a federal right to have accurate information in his or
her parole file. ... [O]ur precedent is definite and precise
on this point: in the absence of a cognizable liberty
interest, a state prisoner cannot challenge parole procedures
under the Due Process Clause.” (citations omitted));
Mitchell v. Ballard, 253 F.3d 705, 2001 WL 498443,
at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 12, 2001) (per curiam) (“Mitchell
argues that he is entitled to prospective injunctive relief
prohibiting the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles from
considering criminal charges which were dismissed and
expunged by a state court in making future parole
determinations in violation of his due process rights.
Because Mitchell does not have a protected liberty interest
in parole, he may not challenge the Texas Board of Pardons
and Paroles' procedures in making future parole
determinations on due process grounds.” (citing
Johnson, 110 F.3d at 308)).
Ingram v. Davis, No. 3:19-cv-1858-L-BN, 2019 WL
5685379, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2019) (footnote omitted),
rec. accepted, 2019 WL 5684528 (N.D. ...