United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Austin Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES
W. AUSTIN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
HONORABLE LEE YEAKEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court are Defendant Mack Edward Breed's Rule 12(b)(6)
Motion to Dismiss, and Motion for Summary Judgment on the
Pleadings (Dkt. No. 32); and Plaintiff's Response (Dkt.
No. 34). The District Court referred these Motions to the
undersigned for report and recommendation pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 1(c) of Appendix C of the Local
Robert Watts originally brought claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against Northside Independent School District and
Mack Edward Breed in both his individual and official
capacities. The undersigned authored a Report and
Recommendation regarding a prior motion to dismiss
recommending that the district court dismiss the 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claims against Northside Independent School
District and Mack Edward Breed in his official capacity with
prejudice for failure to state a claim. Dkt. No. 15. The
district court adopted the recommendation (Dkt. No. 18), and
thus the only remaining claims in the suit are Watts'
claims against Breed individually.
First Amended Complaint Watts asserts that Breed violated his
substantive due process right to “bodily integrity and
personal security” and that in doing so he acted with
deliberate indifference. Id. at ¶ 19. Watts
also sues Breed for assault and battery, negligence, and
civil conspiracy. Id. at ¶ ¶ 20-22. The
claims in the First Amended Complaint are essentially
identical to Watts' claims in his Original Petition with
the exception of the addition of the state tort
claims arise from a football game he officiated on September
4, 2015, in Marble Falls, Texas. The game was between John
Jay High School, which is part of Northside Independent
School District and Marble Falls High School. Breed was an
assistant football coach at John Jay High School and an
employee of NISD. Watts was part of a referee crew from the
Austin Chapter of the Texas Association of Sports Officials.
Watts asserts that shortly before the game ended, Coach
Breed, angry at some of the officials' calls, directed
two John Jay players to hit Watts and “make him
pay” for the bad calls and racist statements Breed
alleges Watts made. Thereafter, two Jay players tackled Watts
from behind, knocking him to the ground. Watts alleges he
suffered cuts, bruises, abrasions, and a concussion from the
moves for summary judgment on the § 1983 claim based on
qualified immunity. He further moves the Court to dismiss the
assault and battery, negligence, and civil conspiracy claims
as barred by the relevant statute of limitations.
judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine issue exists
“if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The
Court must examine “whether the evidence presents a
sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or
whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law.” Id. at 251-52. The Court must
view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.
Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 826 F.3d 272,
274-75 (5th Cir. 2016).
moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party
demonstrates an absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving
party's case, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving
party to come forward with specific facts showing that a
genuine issue for trial does exist. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986). “After the nonmovant has been given an
opportunity to raise a genuine factual issue, if no
reasonable juror could find for the nonmovant, summary
judgment will be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S.
Motion to Dismiss
deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, “[t]he court accepts all well-pleaded
facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to
the [nonmovant].” In re Katrina Canal Breaches
Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 552 U.S.
1182 (2008). While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion does not need detailed factual allegations in order to
avoid dismissal, the plaintiff's factual allegations
“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The Supreme Court has
explained that a court need not accept as true conclusory
allegations or allegations stating a legal conclusion.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)