Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Sol IP, LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Marshall Division

December 16, 2019

SOL IP, LLC, Plaintiff,
v.
AT&T MOBILITY LLC, Defendant, ERICSSON INC. and NOKIA OF AMERICA CORPORATION, Intervenors. SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY L.P., SPRINT SOLUTIONS, INC., and SPRINT SPECTRUM L.P., Defendants, ERICSSON INC. and NOKIA OF AMERICA CORPORATION, Intervenors. VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC. and CELLCO PARTNERSHIP d/b/a VERIZON WIRELESS, Defendants, ERICSSON INC. and NOKIA OF AMERICA CORPORATION, Intervenors. Plaintiff's Proposed Construction Defendants' Proposed Construction Plaintiff's Proposed Construction Defendants' Proposed Construction Plaintiff's Proposed Construction Defendants' Proposed Construction Plaintiff's Proposed Construction Defendants' Proposed Construction Plaintiff's Proposed Construction Defendants' Proposed Construction Plaintiff's Proposed Construction Defendants' Proposed Construction

          CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING “LTE A” PATENTS

          ROY S. PAYNE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         On December 4, 2019, the Court held a hearing to determine the proper construction of disputed claim terms within the group of patents referred to by the parties as the “LTE A” patents, namely United States Patents No. 8, 270, 354, 8, 320, 337, 8, 593, 936, 8, 761, 814, 8, 971, 168, 9, 155, 066, 9, 265, 063, 10, 009, 884, 10, 231, 211, and RE45, 466. Having reviewed the arguments made by the parties at the hearing and in their claim construction briefing (Dkt. Nos. 205, 226 & 233), [1] having considered the intrinsic evidence, and having made subsidiary factual findings about the extrinsic evidence, the Court hereby issues this Claim Construction Memorandum and Order. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831, 841 (2015).

         TABLE OF CONTENTS

         I. BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 4

         II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES ........................................................................................................... 5

         III. THE PARTIES' STIPULATED TERMS ........................................................................... 8

         IV. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS IN THE PAGING PATENTS .................. 8

         (A) A. “radio resource channel” ................................................................................................. 9

         (A) B. “downlink shared channel” Terms ................................................................................ 13

         (A) C. “scheduling identifiers” Terms ...................................................................................... 18

         (A) D. “the identifier exists or not according to whether or not the paging information is generated” ........................................................................................................................... 26

         (A) E. “the first signal” ............................................................................................................. 27

         V. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS IN THE RANDOM ACCESS PATENTS ....................................................................................................................................................... 30

         (A) F. “the scheduling ID is specific for the mobile station and identification for random access procedure” ............................................................................................................... 32

         (A) G. “responses for random access for a plurality of terminals” ........................................... 35

         (A) H. “random access preamble” Terms ................................................................................. 36

         (A) I. “informing transmission” ................................................................................................ 41

         (A) J. “the identifier is determined based on a resource region for random access, the resource region being expressed in a frequency and time” ................................................ 42

         VI. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS IN THE CARRIER AGGREGATION PATENTS .................................................................................................................................... 46

         (A) K. “index” Terms ............................................................................................................... 47

         VII. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 52

         I. BACKGROUND

         Plaintiff Sol IP, LLC (“Plaintiff” or “Sol”) has alleged patent infringement by Defendants AT&T Mobility LLC, Sprint Communications Co. LP, Sprint Solutions, Inc., Sprint Spectrum LP, and Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless (“Defendants”). At least for purposes of these claim construction proceedings, the parties use “Defendants” to also include Intervenor Ericsson Inc. (Dkt. No. 176 at 2; Dkt. No. 205 at 1 n.1) and Intervenor Nokia of America Corporation (see Dkt. No. 240; see also Dkt. No. 243, Nov. 18, 2019 Order).

         Pursuant to the Court's September 9, 2019 Order (Dkt. No. 173), Plaintiff grouped the asserted patents into three groups, designated “LTE A” (or “LTE I”), “LTE B” (or “LTE II”), and “WiFi.” See Dkt. No. 202. The present Claim Construction Memorandum and Order addresses the “LTE A” patents. These are United States Patents No. 8, 270, 354 (“the '354 Patent”), 8, 320, 337 (“the '337 Patent”), 8, 593, 936 (“the '936 Patent”), 8, 761, 814 (“the '814 Patent”), 8, 971, 168 (“the '168 Patent”), 9, 155, 066 (“the '066 Patent”), 9, 265, 063 (“the '063 Patent”), 10, 009, 884 (“the '884 Patent”), 10, 231, 211 (“the '211 Patent”), and RE45, 466 (“the '466 Patent”) (Dkt. No. 205, Exs. A1-A10).

         Plaintiff submits that “[t]hese patents concern cellular communications, in particular communications between cell sites and mobile devices.” Dkt. No. 205 at 2. Plaintiff also asserts that “[t]he cellular communication patents in this case relate to technologies incorporated into 3GPP's Long Term Evolution or LTE standards, also known as 4G.” Id.

         Shortly before the start of the December 4, 2019 hearing, the Court provided the parties with preliminary constructions with the aim of focusing the parties' arguments and facilitating discussion. Those preliminary constructions are noted below within the discussion for each term.

         II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

         “It is a ‘bedrock principle' of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.'” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Claim construction is clearly an issue of law for the court to decide. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970-71 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). “In some cases, however, the district court will need to look beyond the patent's intrinsic evidence and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the background science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant time period.” Teva, 135 S.Ct. at 841 (citation omitted). “In cases where those subsidiary facts are in dispute, courts will need to make subsidiary factual findings about that extrinsic evidence. These are the ‘evidentiary underpinnings' of claim construction that we discussed in Markman, and this subsidiary factfinding must be reviewed for clear error on appeal.” Id. (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)).

         To determine the meaning of the claims, courts start by considering the intrinsic evidence. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313; see also C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc'ns Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The intrinsic evidence includes the claims themselves, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; C.R. Bard, 388 F.3d at 861. Courts give claim terms their ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention in the context of the entire patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312- 13; accord Alloc, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

         The claims themselves provide substantial guidance in determining the meaning of particular claim terms. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. First, a term's context in the asserted claim can be very instructive. Id. Other asserted or unasserted claims can aid in determining the claim's meaning because claim terms are typically used consistently throughout the patent. Id. Differences among the claim terms can also assist in understanding a term's meaning. Id. For example, when a dependent claim adds a limitation to an independent claim, it is presumed that the independent claim does not include the limitation. Id. at 1314-15.

         “[C]laims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.'” Id. at 1315 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 979). “[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.'” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); accord Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This is true because a patentee may define his own terms, give a claim term a different meaning than the term would otherwise possess, or disclaim or disavow the claim scope. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. In these situations, the inventor's lexicography governs. Id. The specification may also resolve the meaning of ambiguous claim terms “where the ordinary and accustomed meaning of the words used in the claims lack sufficient clarity to permit the scope of the claim to be ascertained from the words alone.” Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325. But, “[a]lthough the specification may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed claim language, particular embodiments and examples appearing in the specification will not generally be read into the claims.” Comark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); accord Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.

         The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim construction because a patent applicant may also define a term in prosecuting the patent. Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. Lifescan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“As in the case of the specification, a patent applicant may define a term in prosecuting a patent.”). “[T]he prosecution history (or file wrapper) limits the interpretation of claims so as to exclude any interpretation that may have been disclaimed or disavowed during prosecution in order to obtain claim allowance.” Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

         Although extrinsic evidence can be useful, it is “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Technical dictionaries and treatises may help a court understand the underlying technology and the manner in which one skilled in the art might use claim terms, but technical dictionaries and treatises may provide definitions that are too broad or may not be indicative of how the term is used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Similarly, expert testimony may aid a court in understanding the underlying technology and determining the particular meaning of a term in the pertinent field, but an expert's conclusory, unsupported assertions as to a term's definition are entirely unhelpful to a court. Id. Generally, extrinsic evidence is “less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms.” Id.

         The Supreme Court of the United States has “read [35 U.S.C.] § 112, ¶ 2 to require that a patent's claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014). “A determination of claim indefiniteness is a legal conclusion that is drawn from the court's performance of its duty as the construer of patent claims.” Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Nautilus, 134 S.Ct. 2120.

         III. THE PARTIES' STIPULATED TERMS

         The parties submitted in their September 11, 2019 P.R. 4-3 Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement that “[t]here are no currently agreed constructions.” Dkt. No. 176 at 2.

         IV. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS IN THE PAGING PATENTS

         Plaintiff refers to the '814 Patent, the '066 Patent, and the '211 Patent as the “Paging Patents.” Dkt. No. 205 at 4. Plaintiff submits that these patents “teach a method of transmitting paging information that flexibly maps paging information into the base station's transmission while informing user equipment where to find such information.” Id. at 4-5. Defendants submit that “[t]he Paging Patents' claims recite various alternative channel configurations for transmitting paging information.” Dkt. No. 226 at 3.

         The '814 Patent, titled “Method for Paging Information in Cellular System, ” issued on June 24, 2014, and bears an earliest priority date of April 26, 2006. The Abstract of the '814 Patent states:

Provided is a method for transmitting paging information in a cellular system. An object of the method is transmitting paging information which can improve applicability of a limited radio resource by variably and flexibly setting up and mapping a transport channel and a physical channel in order to transmit information notifying start of downlink information from a base station to a terminal in a cellular system for packet transmission. The method includes the steps of: forming a paging channel (PCH) in a transport channel corresponding to generation of paging information; setting a paging indication channel (PICH) based on the paging information and forming the paging indication channel in a radio resource of a physical layer; and allocating the paging channel to the radio resource of the physical layer.

         The '066 Patent resulted from a continuation of the '814 Patent, and the '211 Patent resulted from a continuation of the '066 Patent. Plaintiff submits that these three patents “share a substantially similar specification.” Dkt. No. 205 at 4. Defendants submit that “[t]he Paging Patents share an identical specification.” Dkt. No. 226 at 2 n.1.

         (A)A. “radio resource channel”

Plaintiff's Proposed Construction

Defendants' Proposed Construction

Plain and ordinary meaning. Alternatively, “physical shared channel.”

Indefinite

Dkt. No. 176-1 at 1; Dkt. No. 205 at 6; Dkt. No. 226 at 13; Dkt. No. 253-1 at 1. The parties submit that this term appears in Claim 10 of the '814 Patent. Id.

         Shortly before the start of the December 4, 2019 hearing, the Court provided the parties with the following preliminary construction: “physical channel in a wireless communication system.”

         (1) The Parties' Positions

         Plaintiff submits that the claim at issue expressly recites that a radio resources channel is a physical channel, and “both the paging channel and the downlink shared channel are mapped to the same radio resource channel, making that radio resource channel a shared channel.” Dkt. No. 205 at 6. Plaintiff argues that “[w]hile ‘the radio resource channel' and ‘the control channel' may have to be distinct in the context of the claim, no ambiguity arises merely because such terms have overlapping meanings before considering the other requirements of the claim.” Id. (emphasis in original)

         Defendants respond that “[t]he term ‘radio resource channel' has no known meaning, either in the art generally or within the patent.” Dkt. No. 226 at 13 (footnote omitted). Defendants also submit that “Claim 10's use of the separate terms ‘physical channel' and ‘radio resource channel' would indicate to a POSITA that [the] two terms differ in meaning, ” but “[t]he claim, however, provides no guidance on the purported similarities or differences between these two terms.” Id. at 14 (citation omitted). Defendants note that “[t]he term is not used once in the specification.” Id. (emphasis in original). Defendants also discuss prosecution history and argue that “a POSITA would have understood that a ‘radio resource channel' cannot be a radio frame or PCH block 12 as referred to during prosecution.” Id. at 17. Finally, Defendants argue that “Sol IP's proposed alternative construction of ‘physical shared channel' lacks any support in the intrinsic record and cannot be correct.” Id. at 18.

         Plaintiff replies that “Defendants' brief does not dispute that a ‘channel' is a path for transmitting signals, ” and “[t]here is no requirement that claims use the same words as the written description.” Dkt. No. 233 at 2 (emphasis in original).

         (2) Analysis

         Plaintiff submits technical definitions of “channel, ” such as “a path along which signals can be sent.” Dkt. No. 205-12, The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms 157-58 (7th ed. 2000).

         Defendants submit the opinion of their expert that “radio resource channel” is not a known term of art. Dkt. No. 208-5, Sept. 11, 2019 Roy Decl. at ¶ 37. Plaintiff does not show any established meaning for this term as a whole. Instead, Plaintiff argues that the meaning of this term is sufficiently clear in the context in which the term appears in the claim.

         Claim 10 of the '814 Patent recites (emphasis added):

10. A method for transmitting paging information at a base station in a wireless communication system, the method comprising:
when paging information is generated,
mapping a paging channel including the paging information and a downlink shared channel for user data transmission into a radio resource channel;
forming a physical layer frame comprising a control channel and the radio resource channel; and
transmitting the physical layer frame to a terminal, wherein an identifier for notifying existence of the paging channel is transmitted through the control channel, and the control channel includes radio resource allocation information for the paging channel, and
when paging information is not generated, mapping the downlink shared channel into the radio resource channel,
wherein the paging channel and the downlink shared channel are transport channels, and the control channel and the radio resource channel are physical channels,
wherein the identifier is used by reserving and allocating a part of scheduling identifiers.

         The distinct recitals of a “control channel, ” a “radio resource channel, ” and “physical channels” give rise to an inference that these different terms have different meanings. See, e.g., CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use of these different terms in the claims connotes different meanings.”) (citation omitted).

         The specification refers to channels but does not refer to a “radio resource channel” and therefore does not specify the meaning of this term. See, e.g., '814 Patent at 1:15-22 (“paging channel (PCH)”, “secondary common control physical channel (S-CCPCH), ” “forward access channel (FACH)”), 2:1-6 (discussing LTE and WCDMA), 2:34-35 (“paging indication channel (PICH)”), 5:17-18 (“downlink shared channel (DL-SCH)”) & 5:34-35 (“broadcasting channel (BCH)”). Nothing in the specification indicates whether one or more of these channels could be considered a “radio resource channel.”

         Nonetheless, the claim language is sufficiently clear on its face that a “radio resource channel” is a type of “physical channel” in the context of a wireless communication system. Other portions of the '814 Patent are consistent with this understanding. See '814 Patent at Abstract (“radio resource of a physical layer”); see also Id. at 3:14 (“FIG. 6 shows a physical layer control channel”). The opinions of Defendants' expert to the contrary are unpersuasive. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 208-5, Sept. 11, 2019 Roy Decl. at ¶ 40 (“This confusion stems from the improper use of ‘radio resource' to modify ‘channel.' A POSITA would understand that a physical channel is transmitted over radio resources. Thus, one of the responsibilities of the network is to allocate ‘radio resources' to particular ‘physical channels.' See, e.g., '814 Patent at 2:44 (“radio resource of a physical channel”); Dkt. No. 208-5, Sept. 11, 2019 Roy Decl. at ¶¶ 39, 59 (“[A] radio resource channel cannot be a physical control channel because the claims of the '814 Patent differentiate the two.”).

         Defendants also cite prosecution history in which the patentee distinguished the “Choi” reference, United States Patent Application Publication No. 2004/0180675. See Dkt. No. 226-2, June 30, 2012 Response Under 37 C.F.R. §1.114 at SOL-FH-0001884, -90; see also Dkt. No. 226-3, Mar. 6, 2012 Office Action at SOL-FH-0001778; Dkt. No. 226-4, Nov. 23, 2011 Amendment at SOL-FH-0001766. Defendants argue that the patentee's statements regarding “radio resource channel (12, radio frame)” in Figure 4 (which illustrates “PCH block” 12) are internally inconsistent because “[a] POSITA would understand that a ‘radio resource channel' cannot be both a block and a frame” and “a POSITA would have understood that a ‘radio resource channel' cannot be a radio frame or PCH block 12 as referred to during prosecution.” Dkt. No. 226 at 17; see Id. at 15-17; see also Dkt. No. 208-5, Sept. 11, 2019 Roy Decl. at ¶ 50 (“To the extent the Applicant was referring to element ‘12' of Figure 4 in the specification . . ., that reference also does not provide clarity. Element ‘12', shown as ‘PCH block' . . ., is not defined as a radio frame and is only depicted as a part of a radio frame.”); id. at ¶¶ 48-51.

         Defendants identify no statements in the prosecution history regarding the meaning of “radio resource channel, ” let alone any definitive statements inconsistent with the claim language. See, e.g., Omega Eng'g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“As a basic principle of claim interpretation, prosecution disclaimer promotes the public notice function of the intrinsic evidence and protects the public's reliance on definitive statements made during prosecution.”) (emphasis added).

         Finally, Plaintiff proposes also that a “radio resource channel” is a “shared” channel, but Plaintiff's proposal in this regard would tend to confuse rather than clarify the scope of the claim. Instead, other claim language already expressly addresses, for example, “mapping . . . into a radio resource channel.” The Court therefore hereby construes “radio resource channel” to mean “physical channel in a wireless communication system.”

         (A)B. “downlink shared channel” Terms

“downlink shared channel”

(’066 Patent, Claim 10; ’814 Patent, Claim 10)

Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

Plain and ordinary meaning.

Alternatively, “shared channel used for downlink.”

“DL-SCH, a downlink transport channel for user data transmission”

“wherein . . . the downlink shared channel are physical channels”

(’066 Patent, Claim 11)

Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction
Plain and ordinary meaning, with “downlink shared channel” construed as proposed above. Indefinite

Dkt. No. 176-1 at 9; Dkt. No. 205 at 7; Dkt. No. 226 at 9; Dkt. No. 253-1 at 1 & 3.

         Shortly before the start of the December 4, 2019 hearing, the Court provided the parties with the following preliminary constructions for these two disputed terms, respectively: “shared channel used for downlink”; and “Plain meaning apart from the Court's construction of ‘downlink shared channel.'”

         (1) The Parties' Positions

         Plaintiff argues that “Defendants seek to rewrite the claims to limit the ‘downlink shared channel' to one embodiment, ” which “contradicts the clear claim language indicating that ‘downlink shared channel' encompasses both physical channels and transport channels.” Dkt. No. 205 at 7.

         Defendants respond: “The dispute here centers on one issue: whether the DL-SCH, a transport channel, can also be a physical channel. In short, the answer is ‘no.'” Dkt. No. 226 at 9. Defendants argue that “[t]he only specification support for the claims at issue promotes Defendants' proposed construction, ” and “Sol IP's claim differentiation argument cannot overcome the written description found in the specification or the prosecution history.” Id. at 10 (emphasis in original). Defendants emphasize that “[w]hether or not claims differ from each other, one cannot interpret a claim to be broader than what is contained in the specification and claims as filed.” Id. at 11 (quoting Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).

         Plaintiff replies that “Sol IP's construction is the clear meaning of the term, and defendants make no lexicography or disclaimer argument, so that should be the end of the story.” Dkt. No. 233 at 2. Plaintiff argues: “Defendants misframe the issue as whether ‘a transport channel[] can also be a physical channel.' Dkt. No. 226, at 9. The actual dispute is obviously whether the ‘downlink shared channel' is limited to a transport channel at all.” Dkt. No. 233 at 2 n.2. Plaintiff submits that Defendants “seek to limit the invention to the disclosed embodiment.” Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff urges that “the claims here do not recite ‘DL-SCH,' but rather ‘downlink shared channel,' meaning the claims always included any downlink shared channel and not just the transport downlink shared channel DL-SCH.” Id. at 3.

         (2) Analysis

         Plaintiff's expert explains that, in the relevant field of communications, a network is viewed as having multiple layers, including a physical layer (the lowest layer, where data is transmitted over a physical transmission medium) and a transport layer (a higher layer, where data is delivered to different data services). Dkt. No. 208-1, Sept. 11, 2019 Wells Decl. at ¶ 46 nn.4- 5. Defendants have not contested these general opinions.

         Claims 10 and 11 of the '066 Patent recite (emphasis added)

10. A method for transmitting paging information, performed in a base station, the method comprising:
when a paging information is generated, allocating the paging information to a downlink shared channel;
allocating an identifier indicating existence of the paging information and a radio resource allocation information indicating radio resource to which the paging information is allocated to a control channel; and
transmitting the control channel and the downlink shared channel to a terminal,
wherein when the paging information is not generated, the identifier is not allocated to the control channel, and
wherein the identifier is used by reserving and allocating a part of scheduling identifiers.
11. The method of claim 10, wherein the control channel and the downlink shared channel are physical channels.

         The recital in dependent Claim 11 of the '066 Patent that the downlink shared channel is a physical channel suggests that the “downlink shared channel” introduced in Claim 10 of the '066 Patent may or may not be a physical channel. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (“the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is not present in the independent claim”).

         Defendants note the principle that “[c]laim differentiation is not a hard and fast rule and will be overcome by a contrary construction dictated by the written description or prosecution history.” CardSoft, LLC v. VeriFone, Inc., 807 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Moreover, Defendants cite authority for the proposition that later-added dependent claims “cannot overcome the claim scope that is unambiguously prescribed by the specification.” Cave Consulting Grp., LLC v. OptumInsight, Inc., 725 Fed.Appx. 988, 995 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 21, 2018).

         Turning, then, to the remaining intrinsic evidence, Claim 10 of the '814 Patent recites a “downlink shared channel” that is a “transport channel” (emphasis added):

10. A method for transmitting paging information at a base station in a wireless communication system, the method comprising:
when paging information is generated,
mapping a paging channel including the paging information and a downlink shared channel for user data transmission into a radio resource channel;
forming a physical layer frame comprising a control channel and the radio resource channel; and
transmitting the physical layer frame to a terminal, wherein an identifier for notifying existence of the paging channel is transmitted through the control channel, and the control channel includes radio resource allocation information for the paging channel, and
when paging information is not generated, mapping the downlink shared channel into the radio resource channel,
wherein the paging channel and the downlink shared channel are transport channels, and the control channel and the radio resource channel are physical channels,
wherein the identifier is used by reserving and allocating a part of scheduling identifiers.

         In some cases, consistent usage of a term can justify a particular interpretation. See Nystrom v. TREX Co., Inc., 424 F.3d 1136, 1144-45 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (construing “board” to mean “wood cut from a log, ” noting that in the intrinsic record the patentee “consistently used the term ‘board' to refer to wood cut from a log, ” and stating that the patentee “is not entitled to a claim construction divorced from the context of the written description and prosecution history”).

         Defendants cite disclosure in the specification regarding the “DL-SCH” transport channel, which Defendants argue corresponds to the ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.