United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Fort Worth Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MCBRYDE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 filed by petitioner, Walter Daniel Nelson, a
state prisoner confined in the Correctional Institutions
Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ),
against Lorie Davis, director of that division, respondent.
After having considered the pleadings and relief sought by
petitioner, the court has concluded that the petition should
be dismissed as time-barred.
pleadings and documentary evidence presented by the parties
reflect that in 1994 petitioner was convicted on two counts
of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon in Tarrant County,
Texas, Case Nos. 0515354A and 0515408A, and was sentenced to
25 years' confinement in each case. (OlSHR 6, 21-2; O2SHR
6, 21-5.) He was released on parole on December 4,
2014, and was arrested on various pre-revocation warrants and
re-released in the intervening years, culminating in the
revocation of his parole on August 21, 2017.
(Resp't's Resp., Ex. A, 3-4, doc. 29.)
returned to TDCJ custody on September 26, 2017. (Id.
at 4.) The revocation resulted in the forfeiture of 2 years,
5 months, and 11 days of street time credit, which were
"added back to the end of [petitioner's]
sentence." (Id. at 4-5.) Petitioner sought
administrative and state court remedies, to no avail. He
filed this federal habeas petition on December 28, 2018,
seeking credit for his street time and immediate
release. (Pet. 6-7, 10, doc. 1.) Respondent asserts
that the petition is time-barred or, in the alternative,
without merit, (Resp't's Answer 1.)
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
28, United States Code, § 2244(d) imposes a one-year
statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of
habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. 28 U.S, C. §
the provision provides:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for
State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect
to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be
counted toward ...