Court of Appeals of Texas, Sixth District, Texarkana
Submitted Date: December 17, 2019
Appeal from the 336th District Court Fannin County, Texas
Trial Court No. CV-19-44288.
Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
E. Stevens Justice.
J. Woods sued Candido John Caniglio for breach of contract
and a declaration of rights pursuant to a farm lease
agreement. According to Woods, although Caniglio leased the
exclusive right to harvest hay on his 107-acre farm to Woods
through December 31, 2020, Caniglio harvested the hay
himself. In urging the trial court to grant a temporary
injunction enjoining Caniglio from interfering with his
rights under the farm lease agreement, Woods argued
Caniglio's continued use of the property would
"result in loss of income to Woods and cause him to
spend substantial sums of money."
filed this interlocutory appeal from the trial court's
order granting Woods' temporary injunction arguing, among
other things, that Woods failed to demonstrate the element of
irreparable harm. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(4) (Supp.). Because we conclude
that the temporary injunction fails to adequately recite
specific reasons supporting the finding of irreparable harm,
as required by Rule 683 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure, we will, without the need to rule on any
substantive issues between the parties, vacate the temporary
injunction order and remand this matter to the trial court
for further proceedings.
injunctions are issued to preserve the status quo until trial
on the merits." Good Shepherd Hosp., Inc. v. Select
Specialty Hosp.-Longview, Inc., 563 S.W.3d 923, 927
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (citing Hartwell v.
Lone Star, PCA, 528 S.W.3d 750, 759 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2017, pet. dism'd)). Before a temporary injunction can
issue, "there must be proof of '(1) a cause of
action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the
relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable
injury in the interim.'" Id. (quoting
Hartwell, 528 S.W.3d at 759). A temporary injunction
must adequately address these elements pursuant to Rule 683
of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
relevant part, [Rule] 683 requires every order granting a
temporary injunction to state the reasons for its issuance
and to be specific in its terms." Id. at 928
(quoting Indep. Capital Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Collins,
261 S.W.3d 792, 795 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.) (citing
Tex.R.Civ.P. 683)). "The requirements of rule 683 are
mandatory and must be strictly followed." Id.
(quoting Collins, 261 S.W.3d at 795) (citing
Qwest Commc'ns Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 24
S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam); InterFirst Bank
San Felipe, N.A. v. Paz Constr. Co., 715 S.W.2d 640, 641
(Tex. 1966) (per curiam))). "If a temporary injunction
order fails to comply with the requirements of rule 683, it
is void." Id. (quoting Collins, 261
S.W.3d at 795) (citing Qwest Commc'ns Corp., 24
S.W.3d at 337; AutoNation, Inc. v. Hatfield, 186
S.W.3d 576, 581 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no
the trial court's order concludes that Woods would suffer
irreparable harm, it should also have "recite[d] facts
supporting [that] determination" in order to satisfy
Rule 683. Id. at 929.
injury is irreparable if the injured party cannot be
adequately compensated in damages or if the damages cannot be
measured by any certain pecuniary standard." Butnaru
v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002).
Woods's prayer for injunctive relief stated that the harm
he faced if the injunction were not granted would be
"loss of income . . . [and] substantial sums of
money." The trial court's order merely recites:
Unless Defendant Coniglio is deterred . . ., Plaintiff will
suffer imminent and irreparable injury without an adequate
remedy at law, in that he would be denied the agreed and
reasonable use of the leased property free from obstructions
and restrictions on that right sought to be imposed by
that reason, the trial court enjoined Coniglio from
"interfering with and preventing Woods's rightful
and exclusive use of the leasehold for hay harvesting
purposes" and "[c]utting[, ] baling, transporting
and/or using hay on the subject property and refusing to
allow Wood[s] to harvest the hay as needed."
the order states that Woods would be unable to use the
property, it contains no explanation as to why any resulting
harm from Woods's inability to use the property was
irreparable such that it could not be compensated with money
damages against Caniglio. Since the order did not show
"'the facts the trial court relied on,' the
finding [of irreparable harm] was improperly
conclusory." Good Shepherd Hosp., 563 S.W.3d at
929-30 (quoting Collins, 261 S.W.3d at 796 (citing
In re Chaumette, 456 S.W.3d 299, 306 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, orig. proceeding); Kotz v.
Imperial Capital Bank, 319 S.W.3d 54, 56-57 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 2010, no pet.))).
the trial court's temporary injunction does not satisfy
the requirements of Rule 683, we conclude that it is void. We
vacate the trial court's order and remand ...