the 74th District Court McLennan County, Texas Trial Court
Chief Justice Gray, [*] Justice Davis, and Justice Neill
appellant's parental rights to her child, J.J.M., were
terminated following a bench trial,  appellant's appointed
appellate counsel filed a notice of appeal. Appellant's
counsel has now filed an Anders brief. Counsel
asserts that he has diligently reviewed the record and that,
in his opinion, the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493
(1967); In re E.L.Y., 69 S.W.3d 838, 841 (Tex. App.-
Waco 2002, no pet.) (per curiam) (applying
Anders to termination appeal).
brief meets the requirements of Anders; it presents
a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no
arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re
Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
("In Texas, an Anders brief need not
specifically advance 'arguable' points of error if
counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to
the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal
authorities."); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d
503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Counsel has carefully
discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no
reversible error in the trial court's order of
termination. Counsel has informed us that he has: (1)
examined the record and found no arguable grounds to advance
on appeal; (2) served a copy of the brief and counsel's
motion to withdraw on Appellant; and (3) informed Appellant
of her right to obtain a copy of the record and of her right
to file a pro se response. See Anders, 386
U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d
at 510 n.3; High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex.
Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978); see also Schulman, 252
S.W.3d at 409 n.23.
has filed a pro se response to the Anders brief and
asserts that there are issues that should be addressed on
appeal. Although provided the opportunity, neither the Texas
Department of Family and Protective Services, represented by
the District Attorney for McLennan County, Texas, nor the ad
litem have filed a reply to appellant's pro se response.
The brief filed by appellant's attorney specifically
notes that the record is sufficient to support termination
under Ground O. In her pro se response, appellant challenges
the sufficiency of all of the grounds found by the trial
court to support termination.
receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full
examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the
case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 349-50, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988). An
appeal is "wholly frivolous" or "without
merit" when it "lacks any basis in law or
fact." McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429,
438 n.10, 108 S.Ct. 1895, 1902 n.10, 100 L.Ed.2d 440 (1988).
We have reviewed the entire record and counsel's brief
and have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal.
See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827-28 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005) ("Due to the nature of Anders
briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the
issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for
reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the
requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
47.1."); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509.
legal and factual sufficiency reviews in termination cases
must take into consideration whether the evidence is such
that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or
conviction about the truth of the matter on which the
petitioner bears the burden of proof. In re J.F.C.,
96 S.W.3d 256, 264-68 (Tex. 2002) (discussing legal
sufficiency review); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25
(Tex. 2002) (discussing factual sufficiency review).
In a legal sufficiency review, a court should look at all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to
determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have
formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.
To give appropriate deference to the factfinder's
conclusions and the role of a court conducting a legal
sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in the light most
favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must
assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor
of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so. A
corollary to this requirement is that a court should
disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could
have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.
J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.
factual sufficiency review, a court of appeals must give due
consideration to evidence that the factfinder could
reasonably have found to be clear and convincing.
[T]he inquiry must be "whether the evidence is such that
a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or
conviction about the truth of the State's
allegations." A court of appeals should consider whether
disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could
not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its
finding. If, in light of the entire record, the disputed
evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited
in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder
could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction,
then the evidence is factually insufficient.
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted); see In re
C.H., 89 S.W.2d at 25.
record reflects that J.J.M. first came to the
Department's attention in January 2018 when appellant was
hospitalized in Waco after being picked up by the Waco
police. Appellant, while accompanied by J.J.M., abandoned her
car on a bridge and took J.J.M. to the lobby of a local
hotel. Appellant left her purse and her cell phone in the
still-running car. Appellant was transferred to a psychiatric
facility due to her mental state, and J.J.M. was placed in
the custody of his grandfather. J.J.M. was eventually placed
in foster care. Appellant already had a case with the
Department in relation to her older son, who aged out of
Department supervision while the present case ...