United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
A. FITZWATER SENIOR JUDGE
Larenzo Berlin Glenn (“Glenn”) moves for relief
from judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). For the reasons that
follow, the court denies the motion.
was convicted by a jury in Texas state court of the offense
of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit sexual
assault and sentenced to life in prison. His conviction was
affirmed on direct appeal, see Glenn v. State, 2013
WL 1281912, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dall., Mar. 19, 2013), and his
petition for discretionary review was refused, see Glenn
v. State, PD-531-13 (Tex. Crim. App. July 24, 2013). He
did not file a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme
Court of the United States.
unsuccessfully seeking habeas relief in state court, Glenn
filed a petition for federal habeas relief in this court. On
November 21, 2016 this court denied habeas relief and denied
a certificate of appealability.
November 13, 2019 Glenn filed in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit a motion for authorization to
file a Rule 60(b)(5) and (6) motion in the district court. A
copy of the motion was docketed in this court on December 2,
2019. On December 16, 2019 the magistrate judge denied the
motion for leave as moot on the ground that leave to file a
motion under Rule 60(b) was not required. Applying the prison
mailbox rule, the instant Rule 60(b) motion is deemed filed
on November 9, 2019.
now seeks relief under Rule 60(b)(3), (5), and
Rule 60(c)(1), any ‘motion under Rule 60(b) must be
made within a reasonable time,' unless good cause can be
shown for the delay.” In re Edwards, 865 F.3d
197, 208 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Osborne, 379
F.3d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 2004)). “‘Good cause'
for a reasonable delay must be ‘evaluated on a
case-by-case basis.'” Id. (quoting In
re Osborne, 379 F.3d at 283). The timeliness of a motion
is assessed at the point in time when the moving party has a
basis to make such a motion, regardless of the time that has
passed since judgment was entered. First RepublicBank
Fort Worth v. Norglass, Inc., 958 F.2d 117, 120 (5th
Cir. 1992). “Once a party has grounds to make a Rule
60(b) motion, however, he must bring the motion reasonably
promptly, though ‘the determination of reasonableness
is less than a scientific exercise.'” In re
Edwards, 865 F.3d at 208-09 (quoting First
RepublicBank Fort Worth, 958 F.2d at 121). When the
moving party has failed to appeal and the bases for relief
were known within the time to appeal, “the usual time
period for direct appeal presumptively delimits, as a matter
of law, the ‘reasonable time' contemplated by Rule
60[(c)].” Pryor v. U.S. Postal Serv., 769 F.2d
281, 288 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Groden v. Allen,
2009 WL 1437834, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2009) (Ramirez,
J.) (holding Rule 60(b) motion to be untimely under Rule
60(c) when defendant filed it outside the time for appeal and
failed to show good cause for the delay), rec.
adopted, 2009 WL 1437834, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 22, 2009)
(Fitzwater, C.J.). “Rule 60(b) simply may not be used
as an end run to effect an appeal outside the specified time
limits, otherwise those limits become essentially
meaningless.” Pryor, 769 F.2d at 288.
judgment in this case was entered on November 21, 2016. Glenn
inexplicably waited almost three years before filing his Rule
60(b) motion seeking relief from the judgment, and he fails
to provide an explanation for his failure to timely file his
motion. Nor can the court on its own discern any valid basis
for the delay.
Rule 60(b) motion, Glenn “contest[s] the
‘integrity of [the] “ORDER” [in case
number] N. 3:14-CV-343-D(BH).” P. Mot. at 1. He
challenges this court's dismissal of his “federal
writ” on the basis that he is entitled to relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) because (1) the prosecutor
induced perjury in violation of due process, and (2) there
was fraud on this court. Id. at 4-5. Glenn has
failed to show any reason why he could not have timely filed
a Rule 60(b) motion, presented this argument, and attacked
the validity of this court's judgment.
Glenn has not presented any valid excuse for belatedly filing
his Rule 60(b) motion. To the contrary, it appears that he is
impermissibly attempting to use Rule 60(b) to remedy his own
failure to file a timely appeal of the judgment against him
based on a legal argument of which he has long been aware.
The court concludes that Glenn's nearly three-year delay
in filing his Rule 60(b) motion is not reasonable under the
circumstances of this case, and that Glenn ...