United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Amarillo Division
MARCUS MARCOOT, TDCJ-CID No. 1919783, Plaintiff,
KEITH GENTRY, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION DISMISSING CIVIL RIGHTS
MATTHEW J. KACSMARYK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
MARCUS MARCOOT, acting pro se and while a prisoner
incarcerated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Institutional Division, has filed suit pursuant to Title 42,
United States Code, Section 1983 complaining against the
above-referenced defendants and has been granted permission
to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons,
plaintiffs civil rights complaint is DISMISSED.
prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility brings an action with respect to prison conditions
under any federal law, the Court may evaluate the complaint
and dismiss it without service of process, Ali v.
Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1990), if it is
frivolous,  malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The same standards will
support dismissal of a suit brought under any federal law by
a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility, where such suit concerns prison
conditions. 42 U.S.C. 1997e(c)(1). A Spears hearing
need not be conducted for every pro se
complaint. Wilson v. Barrientos, 926 F.2d
480, 483 n.4 (5th Cir. 1991).
time of filing this complaint, plaintiff was a prisoner
incarcerated at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
(TDCJ) Neal Unit in Amarillo, Texas. By his complaint,
plaintiff sues seven individuals. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff was
scheduled for a medical appointment to have his ears flushed.
Defendant Jackson, a licensed vocational nurse, performed the
procedure to flush plaintiffs ears. Plaintiff claims he asked
for the water to be warmer and defendant Jackson became upset
with him and ordered him out of the medical unit.
alleges that he was later written up (given a disciplinary
infraction) for an assault on defendant Jackson. Plaintiff
filed a grievance demanding the disciplinary charge and
conviction be dismissed from his record and his good time,
lost as a result of the conviction, be restored. Plaintiff
claims this disciplinary infraction possibly cost him parole.
these claims, plaintiff alleges that all defendants
participated in various unlawful acts that resulted in his
disciplinary conviction, including: fabricating evidence
against him, perjury, false statements, failure to
investigate grievances concerning the incident, and failing
to correct misconduct. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and
requests "restoration of his good-time credits" and
Supreme Court has held that a section 1983 claim which
attacks the constitutionality of a conviction (or
imprisonment, as the case may be) does not accrue until that
conviction (or sentence) has been "reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or
called into question by a federal court's issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus." Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477 (1994); Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 94
(5th Cir. 1995). In Edwards v. Balisok, the Supreme
Court approved the application of the Heck doctrine
to the prison disciplinary setting and held that a state
prisoner's claim for damages in a challenge to the
validity of the procedures used to deprive him of good-time
credits was not cognizable under section 1983. Edwards v.
Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997).
plaintiff is challenging a conviction on a disciplinary case
and the resulting sentence. Any consideration of these claims
would necessarily invalidate the conviction and sentence, and
plaintiff has not shown his disciplinary case was reversed or
declared invalid or was called into question by the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus. Thus, his claims are frivolous.
reasons set forth above and pursuant to Title 28, United
States Code, sections 1915 A and 1915(e)(2), as well as Title
42, United States Code, section 1997e(a), it is ORDERED that
the Civil Rights Complaint by plaintiff filed pursuant to
Title 42, United States Code, section ...